COMMENT
POST-YOUNGER EXCESSES IN THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE RESTRAINT:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In the five years since its landmark decision in Younger v. Harris'
and companion cases, 2 the Supreme Court has transformed the relatively
limited rule announced by those cases into a formidable barrier against

interference by the federal courts with allegedly unconstitutional activity
by state officials or private citizens. The Younger cases planted the
doctrine of equitable restraint' squarely in the path of litigants who
sought federal injunctive 4 or declaratory5 relief from criminal proceed1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
3. This terminology will be used throughout this Comment to denote the various
strictures imposed on federal courts' issuance of injunctions and declaratory judgments by
Younger and succeeding cases. Separate nomenclature is necessary to avoid confusion
with the entirely distinct doctrine of abstention. For an explanation of the theoretical
and practical differences between equitable restraint and abstention, see note 15 infra.
4. An injunction is an equitable decree which commands the party to whom it is
directed to perform a specified act or to refrain from an ongoing or planned course of
conduct. Obedience to an injunctive decree can be coerced through use of the contempt
sanction. The remedy is discretionary, and the party who seeks it must meet a stringent
standard. Injunctive relief will issue only where the applicant can show that he will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; in other words, there must be no
alternative remedy at law which is adequate to protect his interests. See note 25 infra.
The cases discussed in this Comment involve requests for permanent injunctions which
would bar the initiation or continuation of state court proceedings or actions by other
governmental units. Different considerations govern the availability of preliminary injunctions. See note 104 infra. See generally Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78
HARv. L. RV. 994 (1965).
5. A declaratory judgment is a final decree which declares the rights and liabilities
of the parties to the action. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201,
2202 (1970), federal courts are empowered to grant the remedy "[in a case of actual
controversy within [their] jurisdiction." Id. § 2201. The principal value of the
declaratory judgment lies in its provision of a mechanism for obtaining an authoritative
judicial determination of legal relationships before controversy ripens to the point where
the parties must resort to such harsher remedies as damages and injunctions. Unlike the
injunction, the declaratory judgment is a noncoercive remedy. It reflects the belief that
civilized litigants will obey the judgment of a court without the threat of judicial
sanction. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGmENis 10 (1st ed. 1934). Refusal to abide
by the terms of a declaratory judgment does not by itself subject a party to stronger
enforcement measures. Id. at 23. While the Act provides for the effectuation of
declaratory judgments through judicial grants of "[flurther necessary or proper relief,"
28 U.S.C. § 2202, it is not clear (at least where the suit presents equitable restraint

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1976:523

Between 1971 and 1974, the
ings already pending in state courts.0
Court fleshed out some of the dimensions of the equitable restraint

doctrine by answering several questions expressly left unresolved by
Younger.7 During its two most recent terms, however, the Court has
wrought significant expansions of the doctrine which point far beyond

the boundaries established by its previous decisions.
tions the jurisdictional hurdle posed by Younger has
the dimensions of a solid wall, barring entry into the
litigants who seek relief from an increasing variety
actions.
The Supreme Court in its recent decisions has:

With these addibegun to assume
federal courts to
of governmental
(1) applied the

doctrine of equitable restraint to civil proceedings in state court which

are "in aid of and closely related to" the state's enforcement of its
criminal laws, in language which strongly suggests the eventual extension of the doctrine to all state civil litigation;' (2) retreated from
issues) whether such relief should take the form of a subsequent protective injunction,
recognition of the judgment's res judicata effect, or some other alternative. See notes 55,
95-99 infra and accompanying text. A further point of distinction between injunctions
and declaratory judgments is that the latter may be had even where another adequate
remedy is available to the plaintiff. FED. R. Civ. P. 57. See generally E. BoRcHARD,
:upra.
6. In general, the doctrine announced in these cases forbids federal anticipatory
relief against pending state prosecutions unless justified by a showing of official bad faith
and harassment or other extraordinary circumstances. Younger and Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971), the two most significant of the six cases, are discussed in detail at
notes 17-62 infra and accompanying text.
7. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Younger delineated the questions reserved for future decision by the Younger majority: (I) whether an injunction action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), falls within the exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), permitting such relief where it is "expressly authorized by
Act of Congress;" (2) whether federal declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate
when the state criminal prosecution is not currently pending, but may occur in the
future; and (3) whether the considerations of comity and federalism which command
nonintervention by federal courts in state criminal proceedings also require the denial of
federal relief when the pending state proceeding is civil in nature. 401 U.S. at 55.
The Court answered the first question affirmatively in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972). See notes 66-75 infra and accompanying text. The second question was
partially resolved in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), where the Court
unanimously approved the granting of federal declaratory relief when state criminal
prosecution is only threatened, but not pending, at the time federal suit is brought. See
notes 78-94 infra and accompanying text. Permanent injunctive relief, however, is
apparently not available against future state prosecutions. See notes 95-105 infra and
accompanying text. No definitive answer has been provided to the third question,
though the decision last term in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), gives
ample warrant for the belief that the Court will eventually extend the equitable restraint
doctrine to many (if not all) types of state civil litigation. See notes 111-44 infra and
accompanying text.
8. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), discussed at notes 111-44 infra
and accompanying text. The doctrine was also applied to military courts-martial in
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), discussed at note 136 infra.
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its earlier approval of federal anticipatory relief when no other proceeding was pending by ruling that equitable restraint requires nonintervention where state court proceedings, though not yet begun

when the federal complaint was filed, were initiated before "proceedings
of substance on the merits" had transpired in federal court;' and (3)
extended the strictures of the equitable restraint doctrine to prohibit

federal injunctions which compel state or municipal executive officials to
adopt measures aimed at preventing recurrence of past unconstitutional
conduct by government employees. 10
The cause of action in each of the above cases (as in most federal
suits dismissed on equitable restraint grounds) was based on section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, better known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

Historically, section 1983 has been regarded as a vehicle for airing
constitutional grievances against state officials in a federal forum, a

statute whose
very purpose. . . was to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
"whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial .... ,,12

This once-dormant law has done yeoman service for constitutional
litigants in the last decade and a half, and presently serves as the basis

for thousands of suits in federal court each year.' 3 Although exact
9. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), discussed at notes 145-80 infra and
accompanying text.
10. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), discussed at notes 181-202 infra and
accompanying text.
11. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
12. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
13. See generally Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & THE
SOCIAL ORDER 557; McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalProtection (pts. 1-2), 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 250 (1974). The
increase in section 1983 litigation has been dramatic. In fiscal year 1960, fewer than
300 actions were filed under section 1983. See id. at 1 & n.2. Applying the same
discount factor used by Professor McCormack in extrapolating the number of section
1983 suits from available statistical data, see note 14 infra, it is estimated that 11,600
lawsuits based on section 1983 were brought during fiscal 1974, the latest year for which
figures have been reported. See ADMImSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES
COURTS, 1974 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECrOR 389-90, Table C 2.
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statistics are not available, 1 4 it is estimated that between ten and twenty-

five percent of these section 1983 actions involve requests for declaratory or injunctive relief against ongoing or anticipated action by some
other unit of government-situations in which the equitable restraint
doctrine is arguably applicable. Thus, an expansive judicial reading of

equitable restraint principles may produce a coincident reduction of
section 1983's efficacy as guarantor of access to a federal forum.
This Comment will examine the growth of the equitable restraint
doctrine from Younger to the present day, and the effect of that growth
on the scope of the remedy provided by section 1983.

The initial

development of tie doctrine will be traced, with particular attention
given to the balance-of-interests analysis employed by the courts in
determining the applicability of the rule in various factual and procedur-

al settings. After establishing the contours of the doctrine in its early
form, the Comment will analyze three recent Supreme Court decisions
which significantly extend the reach of equitable restraint. While one
of these decisions represents an appropriate extension of the rule, it is

proposed that the other two cases reveal an ill-conceived departure from
the useful interest-balancing analysis developed in previous decisions,

and that this trend has ominous implications for the continued vitality of
section 1983 as a bulwark against deprivations of constitutional rights.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EQUITABLE RESTRAINT DOCTRINE:

FROM Younger TO Steffel
The Younger Cases: FederalAnticipatory Relief Against
Pending State CriminalProsecutions

The doctrine of equitable restraint, sometimes denominated (misleadingly, it is felt) one of several "abstention doctrines"'" developed by
14. The uncertainty is created by the categories which the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts uses in its analysis of the federal courts' caseload. Actions brought
under section 1983 are recorded under the heading of "civil rights," a grouping which
also includes suits based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other similar statutes.
Section 1983 suits are also included in the separate category of "prisoners' civil rights."
One commentator estimates that of the 9,733 lawsuits reported under both categories in
fiscal year 1972, 8,000 or so were premised on section 1983. McCormack, supra note
13, at I & n.2; see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1972
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 287, Table C 2. No indication is given in the Report
about the nature of the relief sought, so the assumption in the text following this note
about the proportion of suits seeking injunctions and declaratory judgments must be
taken with a grain of salt.
15. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (Supp. 1972).

The theoretical and practical differences between the classic doctrine of abstention and
the rule of equitable restraint are significant. The abstention doctrine, first enunciated
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the Supreme Court to limit federal court intervention in state court
in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), is applied where
state action is initially challenged in federal court as violative of both the federal
constitution and state law, and it is possible that an unclear provision of state law may be
construed so as to dispose of the case entirely. "In this situation a federal court . . . is
asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow
by a state adjudication." Id. at 500. Therefore, in the interest of avoiding "the waste of
a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication," id.,
the federal court postpones decision and directs the plaintiff to file his suit in state court
instead. Meanwhile, the federal court retains jurisdiction of the case so that if his state
law claim is decided against him, the plaintiff may return to federal court for a now
timely hearing on his constitutional claim. He is permitted to withhold his federal claim
from adjudication by the state court, thereby circumventing the potentially adverse res
judicata effect that would otherwise be given to a state court determination of the federal
claim's merits. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
421-22 (1964).
By contrast, the doctrine of equitable restraint is normally applied when the federal
plaintiff is already (or will soon become) the defendant in a proceeding in state court or
some other adjudicative body, and he comes to federal court seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief from continuation of that proceeding. Questions as to the meaning of
state law are unimportant; the plaintiff hopes only for decision by the federal court on a
claimed violation of the federal constitution. The objection to federal court disposition
of these cases is not that it would occur at the wrong time, but in the wrong forum.
Because of its reluctance to interfere with the legitimate activities of other tribunals and
its confidence in their ability to fairly and correctly decide constitutional issues, the
federal court will dismiss the plaintiff altogether and require him to raise his federal
claims by way of defense in the state proceeding. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45
(1971). Instead of returning to federal court after the constitutional claim has been
decided against him, he must exhaust his appellate remedies within the state (or other)
system to which he was remitted by the federal court. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 609 & n.21 (1975). Federal review is limited to appeal to the Supreme Court
or (in criminal cases) application for writ of habeas corpus.
There has been substantial variety in the descriptive labels attached to the latter
doctrine by both courts and commentators. A few have taken the course followed here
and used the term "equitable restraint" to describe the bundle of rules and principles
established by Younger and its progeny. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974); Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Silva
Recio, 520 F.2d 1342, 1344 n.4 (1st Cir. 1975); see Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); cf. H.M. HART & H. Wechsler, Tim
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1043-44 & n.1 (2d ed. 1973).

Others have

included the doctrine under the unfortunately broad heading of "abstention." Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 834 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1975);
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 523 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir. 1975) (on remand); Anonymous v.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1973);
C. WRIGHT, supra; Comment, The Extension of Younger v. Harris to Non-Criminal
Cases, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 454 n.5 (1974).

The Supreme Court has, however,

expressly recognized the distinction between abstention and the principles of Younger.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 n.21 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
577 (1973). Most have referred to the Younger doctrine as "principles of equity, comity
and federalism." E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, supra at 454; Response of Carolina, Inc. v.
Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314, 320 & nn.16-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
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proceedings, is hardly a new addition to judicial theory.1"

But it was

not until 1971 that the Court chose to elevate the doctrine to the status

of a jurisdictional command with its decision in Younger v. Harris."
Harris, a member of the Progressive Labor Party, had been indicted in

California state court for violating the state's Criminal Syndicalism Act
after distributing party literature which advocated the replacement of

capitalism with socialism.18 He immediately filed suit in federal court
under section 1983 alleging that his impending prosecution and the very
existence of the facially overbroad statute inhibited him in the exercise

of his first amendment rights, and seeking to enjoin Younger (Los
Angeles County's District Attorney) from prosecuting him under the
Act. " ' A three-judge district court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2281 held the Act impermissibly vague and overbroad on its face, and

issued the requested injunction. -0

1050 (1974); Sorger v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 401 F. Supp. 348, 353-54
(E.D. Pa. 1975). In view of the Court's recent extension of Younger to military courtsmartial, see note 136 infra, this label may also be somewhat misleading; clearly neither
"comity" nor "federalism" constrains a federal court to defer to a United States military
tribunal. In any event, "[tihe point . . . is not to achieve terminological purity, but to
make sure that terminology does not obscure the underlying issues." H.M. HART. & H.
WECHSLER, supra, at 1044 n.1.

For an exhaustive scholarly treatment of the Pullman abstention doctrine, see Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
16. The historic reluctance of federal courts to interfere with state prosecutions is
discussed in Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: From
Young to Younger, 32 LA. L. REv. 601 (1972).
17. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Younger has spawned a great deal of commentary.
Especially helpful are Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings:
Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1324 (1972); Sedler, Dombrowski
in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1;
Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U.L.
Rpv. 740 (1974); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State
Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L.
REV. 591 (1975).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE §§

11400-401 (West

1970).

The Act defines criminal

syndicalism as any doctrine that advocates crime, sabotage, unlawful force or terrorism
"as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting
any political change." Id. § 11400. Harris was indicted for distribution of literature
which advanced such teachings, a felony punishable by a prison term of one to fourteen
years. Id. § 11401(3). Eight months after the Younger decision, Harris successfully
appealed a denial of a writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeals, which
declared section 11401(3) unconstitutional. In re Harris, 20 Cal. App. 632, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 844 (1971).
19. Two other PLP members and a local college professor intervened as plaintiffs.
Though not threatened with prosecution themselves, they claimed that the proceeding
against Harris and the presence of the Act cast an unconstitutional chill on their right to
advocate and teach socialist doctrine. 401 U.S. at 39-40.
20. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,2" refusing to reach the
merits of Harris's constitutional claim despite the fact that one of its
recent decisions had raised serious questions as to the constitutionality of
the Act."2 Instead, Justice Black characterized the district court's in-

junction as "a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts
to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances. ' ' He found the unqualified ban on federal injunctions
against state court proceedings (first imposed in 1793 by the AntiInjunction Act) to be persuasive evidence of a longstanding congressional policy against such interference. 24 The Court isolated three
considerations which underlay this policy against federal injunctive interference in state court proceedings. It first pointed to the traditional

equity doctrine that equitable relief is inappropriate against ongoing
criminal prosecutions since the applicant has an adequate remedy at law

and will suffer no irreparable injury if equity declines to act.2'

Only

injury which is "'both great and immediate' " can justify federal intervention, and the burdens incident to defending against a single criminal

prosecution were not enough, in the Court's view, to meet that standard.2 6 Even when the federal plaintiff legitimately complains that the
law he is charged with violating is unconstitutional, equitable interven21. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall concurred in the result in Younger. 401
U.S. at 56. Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter. Id. at 58. Justice Black's opinion
for the majority dismissed the intervenors' allegation of the Act's inhibiting effect as too
"imaginary [and] speculative" to require protection by the federal equity power. 401
U.S. at 42.
22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), overruling Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927). Whitney had upheld the California statute against first amendment claims similar to those raised by Harris.
23. 401 U.S. at 41.
24. Id. at 43. The earliest version of the Anti-Injunction Act flatly prohibited
federal stays of state court proceedings: ". . . nor shall a writ of injunction be granted
to stay proceedings in any court of a state .... ." Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1
Stat. 335. Except for an 1875 amendment which allowed injunctions where expressly
authorized by the federal bankruptcy laws, the statute remained substantially unaltered
until the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 47 at 177-78 & n. 4 (2d ed. 1970). The current version of the AntiInjunction Act reads as follows:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
25. 401 U.S. at 43-44. Though Justice Black appears to have treated adequacy of
the legal remedy and likelihood of irreparable harm as separate facets of the problem,
they are more aptly described as interchangeable labels for a single concept. See I T.
SPELLING,

A

TREATISE ON INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES §

19-20 (2d ed. 1901), quoted in Whitten, supra note 17, at 601-02.
26. 401 U.S. at 46, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926).

13, at
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tion will be warranted only where his rights are threatened in such a way
that they cannot be protected by his defense against the state prosecu-

tion.
The second factor supporting the "hands off" policy is the principle

of comity. 28 In the Younger context, comity signifies the respect which
federal courts must accord to state courts in recognition of the latter's

constitutional obligation to apply and adhere to federal law.2" Given
this obligation, the removal of constitutional litigation from state judiciaries through the issuance of injunctive and declaratory decrees might
convey mistrust of their ability to resolve federal claims fairly and
correctly. 0
The third element of the policy against injunctions was referred to
as "Our Federalism" by Justice Black.

This principle has wider

implications than the notion of comity; it evokes the general aversion to
unnecessary meddling by federal hands in the states' business which is
essential to the smooth functioning of a nation run by two coordinate
systems of government."' The Court's chief concern was that a policy
which routinely permits federal intervention in pending state criminal
cases would fetter the discretion of state prosecutors, a result that might

severely hamper their ability to enforce state law effectively."2
Younger does not establish a per se rule of equitable restraint. The

Court recognized that there were certain circumstances in which the
federal plaintiff would not be able to vindicate his constitutional rights

in defending against a criminal prosecution, and where the resulting
injury would be sufficient to override the general requirement of nonin27. 401 U.S. at 46.
28. Although both "comity" and "federalism" are mentioned in the opinion, no
attempt was made to articulate the different concerns which are comprehended by the
former term. See id. at 44. Justice Black thus appears to have shaded two distinct
concepts into one by implicitly equating comity and federalism, principles whose discrete
character has been underscored by subsequent decisions. See The Supreme Court, 1974
Term, 89 HARV. L. Rav. 47, 151 n.2 (1975), and the last group of cases cited in note 15
su1pra.
29. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
30. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (describing this aspect of
the Younger rationale).
31. According to Justice Black, the concept of "Our Federalism" represents
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both state
and national governments, and in which the national government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. 401 U.S. at 44.
32. See id. at 45.
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tervention. Two such instances were specified by the Court. First, the
state prosecution may have been threatened or initiated in "bad faith"
with no expectation that it would lead to a valid conviction. An example
would be a concerted program of harassment intended to discourage its
targets from the free exercise of their federal rights.3" Justice Black
recounted the official misconduct charged by the federal plaintiffs in
Dombrowski v. Pfisters4 as an illustration of the level of threatened
injury which would justify federal intervention and concluded that

Harris had failed to make any showing of bad faith or harassment in
Younger's attempt to prosecute him under the Syndicalism Act.3 5
33. Id. at 48.
34. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In a none-too-subtle effort to dissuade civil rights
organizers from continuing their work, state and local law enforcement officers in
Louisiana had raided the group's offices and seized its records using sham warrants that
were later vacated for lack of probable cause. After a state court had forbidden the
officials to use the records as evidence in the planned prosecution of the group, the
prosecutor nevertheless continued to vex Dombrowski and co-workers with renewed
threats of prosecution and indictment. He also used photostats of the illegally seized
records at public hearings which were most likely convened for the purpose of stirring up
public antagonism against the civil rights group. 401 U.S. at 48.
35. 401 U.S. at 49. Subsequent litigation concerning the bad faith/harassment
exception to Younger indicates that the courts have accorded it an extremely limited
scope; they have refused to find bad faith almost as often as plaintiffs have alleged it.
See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975); Anonymous v. Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 434-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
122 (1975); Classic Distributors, Inc. v. Zimmerman, 387 F. Supp. 829, 838-39 (M.D.
Pa. 1974) (three-judge court). The leading post-Younger decision on the bad faith
exception is Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), in which five Justices upheld a
lower court finding that various actions taken by Texas Rangers and local sheriff's
deputies to interfere with a United Farm Workers' organizing drive revealed a "pervasive
pattern of intimidation" which satisfied Younger's bad faith test so as to make injunctive
relief appropriate. Id. at 812. Chief Justice Burger's partial dissent (joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist) argued that police misconduct alone was not enough, but must be
shown to have been "part of a common plan or scheme, in concert with the prosecutorial
authorities, to deprive [persons] of their . . . rights" before bad faith could be established. Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added). Justice Powell took no part in the decision of
Allee, and Justice Stevens has since been elevated to the Court from the Seventh Circuit
bench where he proved receptive to the policy of nonintervention embodied in Younger.
See, e.g., Horvath v. City of Chicago, 510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975); Cousins v. Wigoda,
463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), applicationfor stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972) (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice). It is conceivable that these two might eventually join the Allee
dissenters in hewing to this stricter formulation of the bad faith exception. Such a
revision would effectively emasculate the bad faith test as a means for escaping
Younger's prohibitions, given the scant frequency with which such conspiratorial law
enforcement activity occurs. Indeed, the feat may already have been accomplished by
the recent decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), which characterized the
police activity in Allee as "an intentional, concerted, and . . . conspiratorial effort
" Id. at 375 (emphasis added). See note 189 infra.
...
One of the few lower court cases to report a finding of bad faith is Llewelyn v.
Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1975), involving a
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The second exception to Younger's general rule was derived from
the Court's awareness that there might be "extraordinarycircumstances

in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the
absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. '36 One
example of an "extraordinary circumstance" was given by Justice
Black: prosecutions initiated under "a statute [which is] flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph . . . ."7 In other words, federal injunctive

relief might also be warranted where the statute sought to be enforced is
so grossly infirm that it is incapable of constitutional application.3 8 The
statute's deficiencies must be blatantly self-evident before federal inter-

vention is appropriate, however; a merely plausible claim of facial
unconstitutionality is not enough to warrant an injunction against goodfaith efforts to enforce it. "'
district attorney's self-styled campaign of "guerilla warfare" against the film "Naked
Came the Stranger." Id. at 1388. The prosecutor raided Llewelyn's theater on
successive nights in August, 1975 and seized two prints of the film. After being ordered
by a state court to refrain from further seizures until an adversary determination of the
film's obscenity had been made, the prosecutor announced to the media his intention to
seize a copy of the film each day it was exhibited. When Llewelyn resumed showing the
film two weeks later the prosecutor embarked on a warrant-shopping spree, applying to
eight different judges until he found one willing to issue a warrant. The pattern was
repeated on the following evening. The federal district court held that the prosecutor's
disobedience of the court order banning further seizures constituted the sort of bad faith
and harassment which would override the Younger rule. Id. at 1389. See also
Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding allegation of bad faith
sufficient to withstand Younger dismissal of complaint in charges that prosecutor
influenced magistrate to refuse issuance of arrest warrants after prisoners alleged assaults
on them by prison guards); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33,
47-51 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (three-judge court) (finding bad faith in prosecutor's use of state
criminal instruments law to effect repeated seizures of movie projectors used in exhibition of "Deep Throat," and terming such action "a blatant use of an inappropriate
statute," id. at 48).
36. 401 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
38. While the test thus stated is a stringent one, some lower courts have applied it
quite liberally, perhaps as a sub rosa expression of discontent with the Younger doctrine.
For example, in Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (three-judge
court), vacated nen., 423 U.S. 976 (1975), a three-judge court found an Indiana
public nuisance statute used by state officials in their campaign against adult movie
theaters to be "arguably . . . 'flagrantly and patently'" unconstitutional. 423 U.S. at
979 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from district court opinion). The judgment in
Nihiser was vacated for reconsideration in light of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975). 423 U.S. 976. See notes 111-25 infra and accompanying text. See also
Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Il1. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3697 (U.S, June 7, 1976), where a three-judge court held the Illinois prejudgment
attachment law "patently violative" of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
and enjoined the state court from proceeding under it.
39. 401 U.S. at 54.
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It should be noted that the Younger Court advanced the "flagrant
and patent" test as only one illustration of the more inclusive "extraordi-

nary circumstances" exception. A second example was provided by the
Court's unanimous decision three years later in Gibson v. Berryhill40
that federal injunctive relief is appropriate where the state tribunal in
which the proceeding is pending is incompetent to adjudicate the case

before it by reason of bias. The case arose when a firm against which
license revocation proceedings before the Alabama Board of Optometry

had been initiated by the state's optometric association41 brought suit
under section 1983 to enjoin the impending Board hearings on the
ground that the institutional and personal bias of the Board and its
members made a fair hearing impossible."
The Court sustained the

lower court's finding of bias,4 3 observing that while "administrative
proceedings looking toward the revocation of a professional license
. . . may in proper circumstances command the respect due court

proceedings,"'" equitable restraint was not required in this case.

The

40. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
41. The Association asked the Board to revoke the licenses of several optometrists
who were employed by a state-wide optical company (Lee Optical), alleging that the
practice of optometry by salaried employees of a business corporation constituted
unprofessional conduct. The relevant statutory provisions had originally given express
authority for the maintenance of optical departments in commercial stores and incorporated optometric practices, but they had been repealed or amended in 1965 so as to omit
reference to such commercial enterprises. The Alabama Optometric Association interpreted these changes as forbidding the practice of optometry by employees of corporations, and it commenced delicensure proceedings on that basis. Id. at 565-68.
42. Three factors in the case pointed strongly to a "possibility of bias": (1) the
Board had filed suit against Lee Optical in state court soon after the delicensure
complaint had been filed with it seeking to enjoin the company from "engaging in the
unlawful practice of optometry," an action which suggested that the Board (which acted
as both prosecutor and trier of fact in such cases) had prejudged the case on its merits;
(2) Lee Optical had a large share of the optical services market in Alabama, and
revocation of its license and those of its staff optometrists would divert this business to
Board members and other self-employed practitioners; and (3) the Board was a "suspect
adjudicative body" in view of the fact that membership on it was restricted to those who
belonged to the Association that had filed the complaint, and the Association refused
membership to corporate practitioners. Id. at 571.
43. The district court had not required proof of actual bias on the part of individual
Board members. Rather, it regarded the institutional defects described in note 42 supra
as having created a prima facie case of prejudice. Id. at 571. The Supreme Court's
affirmance was based solely on the factor of pecuniary interest. Id. at 578-79.
44. Id. at 576-77. Although the Court's language suggests that the equitable
restraint doctrine might forbid federal court interference with pending administrative
proceedings, the question has not yet been fully resolved. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 44 n.8 (1975). Several lower courts have found the doctrine applicable in the
administrative context. See, e.g., McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1975)
(police department disciplinary hearing); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973) (mayor's removal of municipal civil service commis-
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remittal of a federal plaintiff to his state remedies, the Court reasoned,
"presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a

competent state tribunal the federal issues involved. Here [this] predicate for a Younger. . .dismissal was lacking .... "245
Though Gibson has been described as an application of the Younger bad faith test,40 the decision is more aptly characterized as adding a
second fact situation to Younger's "extraordinary circumstances" exception.47 In addition to those cases where the state court action is

premised on a "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional statute, federal
anticipatory relief against pending adjudicatory proceedings (judicial or
administrative) is justified when the tribunal which conducts the proceeding is incompetent because its members have some financial interest

in the outcome of the case, or have demonstrated by prior actions that
they may have prejudged the case on its merits.48

Thus, the Court

apparently considers an unbiased and fully competent adjudicatory body
to be a prerequisite to the successful invocation of equitable restraint,

recognizing that the comity considerations involved in the equitable
restraint doctrine are based oi the assumption that state tribunals will

faithfully and impartially decide constitutional claims.49
sion members). To be sure, administrative hearing boards are often not staffed by
lawyers, and there may be due process difficulties inherent in having lay persons
adjudicate constitutional claims. Cf. North v. Russell, 516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1974),
af 'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 5085 (U.S. June 28, 1976). Yet many states do not require that
judges have legal training, and Younger makes no such distinction where state courts are
concerned. Thus, it would seem consistent with the tenor of Younger to require federal
courts not to interfere with adjudicatory proceedings within state agencies which have
been given responsibility by statute for interpreting and administering state law. In any
event, the equitable restraint issue will probably not arise in this context as often as it
does with judicial proceedings. State agencies normally deal with questions of state law
such as workmen's compensation and utility rate-setting, and the Pullman abstention
doctrine requires federal courts not to interfere in such cases when the state law issues
are unclear. See note 15 supra.
45. Id. at 577.
46. Whitten, supra note 17, at 668.
47. The structural and procedural flaws which led the Court in Gibson to forgo
equitable restraint are hardly comparable to the outrageous official misconduct for which
courts have previously reserved the rubric of bad faith. See note 35 supra.
48. Although the Court relied only on the factor of pecuniary interest in upholding
the finding of bias, supra note 43, the proposition that prejudgment of the controversy
falls within the Gibson bias exception may be inferred from the Court's language. See
411 U.S. at 578-79.
49. As with the bad faith/harassment exception (see note 35 supra), the Court has
been sparing in its enlargement of the extraordinary circumstances exception. It is
apparently prepared to include within the term only those cases where the plaintiff
demonstrates "an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not
merely . .. presenting a highly unusual fact situation." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 125 (1975).
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The Younger decision established a broad rule, subject to two
closely drawn exceptions, forbidding federal courts to issue injunctions

against pending state criminal pioceedings. The related issue of the
propriety of federal declaratory judgments directed at ongoing state
prosecutions was settled in the companion case of Samuels v. Mackell,''0
with the Court unanimously concluding that where the principles articulated in Younger would make injunctive relief improper, "declaratory
relief should ordinarily be denied as well."'" The principal premise for
the holding was the Court's perception that in most instances a declara-

tory judgment, despite its different theoretical underpinnings, " would
have precisely the same disruptive effect on a pending prosecution as an

injunction. 3 Justice Black supported this assertion with two observations. If declaratory judgments were permitted where injunctions were
not, an injunction might get in the back door disguised as an order to

"protect or effectuate" the previously granted declaratory judgment.5 4
Further, he intimated that a declaratory judgment, though not enforcea-

ble through the contempt sanction as an injunction would be, might
In Kugler, a New Jersey municipal judge who refused to testify on fifth amendment
grounds before a grand jury investigating judicial corruption was summoned to the
conference room of the New Jersey Supreme Court by the Chief Justice, where he was
"sharply questioned" by six justices of that court about his decision not to testify. The
justices had been briefed beforehand by the deputy attorney general in charge of the
grand jury investigation. After his meeting with the justices, the judge had a change of
heart and gave his testimony to the grand jury on the same day. He denied any
involvement in the corrupt activities under scrutiny. Two months later, he was indicted
by the grand jury for having falsely sworn before the grand jury (among other things).
The judge's federal complaint alleged that the broad supervisory powers exercised by the
Chief Justice over state trial judges (including the power to reassign them to less
desirable benches) made it impossible for him to obtain a fair hearing or impartial
appellate review in state court on his claim that his testimony had been coerced. The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court's finding that Helfant's case came
within the extraordinary circumstances exception, relying on the fact that four of the six
New Jersey justices who had interrogated him (including the Chief Justice) had resigned
from the court. The Court felt the changes in the composition of the New Jersey court
had eliminated any potential for judicial abuse that existed at the time Helfant's federal
suit was filed. Id. at 127-29.
50. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). In Samuels, as in Younger, a person under state indictment for violating a statute that arguably infringed first amendment freedoms was
seeking federal anticipatory relief. In Samuels, however, the district court had declined
to intervene. Id. at 67-68.
51. Id. at 73.
52. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
53. 401 U.S. at 72.
54. Federal courts are empowered by the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin state court
proceedings as necessary to "protect or effectuate" earlier federal judgments. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1970); see note 24 supra. The permissibility of using the injunction as a tool
for "protecting or effectuating" the non-coercive declaratory judgment is open to some
doubt. See notes 95-99 infra and accompanying text.
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foreclose relitigation of the constitutional issue in state court through the
operation of ordinary principles of res judicata.5 5 The federal court's
binding advance determination on the merits of the constitutional claim
would therefore convey the same mistrust of the state court's ability to
treat the issue fairly that Younger seeks to avoid. 6
The Court's rationale is defective insofar as it suggests that declaratory judgments have "precisely the same" impact as injunctions on state
proceedings. The injunction flatly commands the state court to proceed
no further in the matter; the declaratory judgment "neither mandates
nor prohibits state action.' 7 Moreover, at least until the res judicata
55. 401 U.S. at 72. Justice Black seemed to be aware that he was traversing
unfamiliar ground with this argument; the quotation from Public Serv. Comm'n v.
Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952) on which he relied is interrogatory rather than
declarative, apparently reflecting doubt in that Court's mind about the extent to which a
federal declaratory judgment should be accorded res judicata effect when its recipient
tries to use it as a bar to state proceedings against him. Justice Brennan also recognized
that the question was "not free from difficulty . .. [and one whose] governing rules
remain to be developed with a view to the proper workings of a federal system." Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971) (separate opinion). Three years later, the Court
appeared to be no closer to an authoritative resolution of the problem. Compare Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1974) with id. at 477 (White, J., concurring) and
id. at 479, 482 n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
While granting res judicata effect to declaratory judgments in these cases would go
against the grain of comity to some extent (see text following note 55), there are
persuasive arguments in favor of such a policy. The Declaratory Judgment Act
contemplates that declaratory judgments "shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). If it is ineffective to bind the state court in
a later prosecution on the issue of the statute's constitutionality, see Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. at 482 n.3 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.), the declaratory judgment would be little
different from the "mere advisory opinions" which federal courts have no power to
render. See id. at 477 (opinion of White, J.). See also Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911). Further, the prinicipal architect of the Act expected that declaratory
judgments would be entitled to res judicata effect. E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS 10-11 (2d ed. 1941), cited in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477 (1974)
(opinion of White, J.),
56. The Court's use of the word "ordinarily" to qualify its holding in Samuels, 401
U.S. at 73, see text accompanying note 51 supra, does not signify a softening of
Younger's general requirements where declaratory judgments are involved. It was
intended merely to leave room for the rare case in which both declaratory and injunctive
relief are permissible under the Younger tests, but an injunction would, nevertheless, be
considered "improper" because it "seemed particularly intrusive or offensive" in that
individual case. 401 U.S. at 73; see Whitten, supra note 17, at 655 n.268. An
interesting illustration of the circumstances in which declaratory relief is deemed
appropriate while injunctive relief is not is found in Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1974).
57. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The milder nature of the declaratory judgment was also expressed in
these words: "Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; non-compliance
with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt." Id. at 126.
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effect to be given such decrees is finally determined, 8 it is not even
necessarily true that the federal declaration of unconstitutionality bars
the state court from rendering its own judgment on that issue. A
sounder analysis was proposed by Justice Brennan in his partial dissent
in Perez v. Ledesma, 0 another of Younger's companion cases. In an
extended discourse on the history and development of the declaratory
judgment as a milder, less intrusive alternative to injunctive relief, "" he
emphasized the fundamental practical differences between declaratory
judgments and injunctions. If the federal court grants a declaratory
judgment that the entire statute is unconstitutional on its face, the state
court is not prevented by the judgment from trying a prosecution under
it. It would ordinarily be futile to do so, since a conviction under a
statute which is so clearly defective would certainly be reversed. However, Justice Brennan observed, the prosecutor is permitted to charge
and try a person under the statute after the declaratory judgment is
issued if he reasonably believes that the conduct involved is not constitutionally protected and hopes to get a narrow construction of the law
from the state courts under which the conviction might be sustained.
"Accordingly, the declaration does not necessarily bar prosecutions
under the statute, as a broad injunction would." 6'
Despite his belief in the relative unobtrusiveness of that remedy,
Justice Brennan acquiesced in the Samuels ban on declaratory judgments in ongoing criminal proceedings because he felt that even this less
bitter pill would offend the principles established in Younger. The
clash, in his view, would be caused by two factors: the adverse reflection on the state judiciary that arises from parallel declaratory proceedings in federal court at a time when the state trial offers the defendant
an adequate forum in which to assert his constitutional claims, and the
federal court stays of the state criminal trial necessary to prevent a
shuffle between courthouses while the federal suit is in progress.12
The Younger decisions established sweeping limitations on the
power of federal courts to grant anticipatory relief against pending state
criminal prosecutions. Taken together, they stand for the proposition
that when the defendant in a state criminal proceeding seeks federal
58. See note 55 supra.
59. 401 U.S. 82, 93-130 (1971)

(opinion of Brennan, J.).

60. Id. at 104-15.
61.

Id. at 125.

62. Id. at 121.

Justice Brennan also expressed the conviction that no such conflict

would be presented where declaratory relief was sought when no state prosecution was

pending, id. at 104, thus presaging the Court's decision three years later in Steffel v.
Thompson. See notes 78-94 infra and accompanying text.
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injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the statute being enforced
against him, considerations of equity, comity and federalism require the
federal court to withhold both remedies absent a showing of bad faith,
harassment, flagrant unconstitutionality of the statute in question, or
other extraordinary circumstances. Yet Younger et al. added little to
substantive federal law. The Court's antipathy toward injunctions
where ongoing state proceedings were involved had been clear at least
since its 1908 decision in Ex parte Young, 3 and it had never smiled
with favor on declaratory interference in that context.6" The true
significance of the decisions lay in the renewed vitality and formidability
with which they infused the doctrine of equitable restraint. Their
portentous tonea5 seemed calculated to serve notice on the lower courts
that discretion in administering anticipatory relief to the subjects of
pending prosecutions would henceforth be closely restricted, and that
deference to the state courts was now commanded rather than commended in all but a very few cases.
InitialElaborationsof the EquitableRestraintDoctrine
Broad though its import may have been, the Younger holding left
unanswered several important questions whose later resolution would
define the ultimate scope of the equitable restraint doctrine. The Court
supplied answers to some of them during the three years following
Younger. Though these decisions do not expressly identify the policy
underlying section 1983 as a separate factor to be assessed in conjunction with equity, comity and federalism considerations in determining
the applicability of the doctrine, the nuances of language and emphasis
in the opinions reveal that this fourth "interest" was very much on the
Court's mind as it attempted to define the limits of the Younger rule.
Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983. In Mitchum v. Foster,"' a
unanimous Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not absolutely bar injunctive relief against state proceedings in suits premised on
42 U.S.C. § 1983.67 The case arose in Bay County, Florida, where the
63. 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908).
64. Cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 127 n.17 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.);
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
65. The joint docketing of six cases, their argument and reargument, the sheer
volume (more than 100 pages) of the written opinions, the frequent invocation of lofty
principle-all these things suggest that the Court thought it was engaged in an undertaking of great import.
66. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
67. The Court's unanimity in Mitchum was not as imposing as it might seem. Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall; the
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prosecutor brought civil suit against the owner of an adult bookstore
(Mitchum) seeking to close the store as a public nuisance.

A state

court issued a preliminary injunction against its continued operation.
After "further inconclusive proceedings" in state courts Mitchum filed a

federal complaint under section 1983 seeking to enjoin further state
action against him.0 8 The Supreme Court reversed a three-judge court's
denial of the request, holding that section 1983 was an act of Congress

which "expressly authorized" injunctive relief against state proceedings
within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act."9
While the Mitchum opinion is of interest for its enunciation of the
test to be applied in determining whether a statute is within the Act's
"expressly authorized" exception, 70 its primary importance for purposes

of the present discussion rests in its treatment of section 1983 in relation
to the doctrine propounded by Younger. Justice Stewart's plurality
opinion laid great stress on the fundamental shift in the distribution of

power within the federal system that was occasioned by the Reconstruction era civil rights legislation, a shift which established "the role of the
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power ....
-71 He drew on the statute's legislative history to bolster
the conclusion that "[t]he very purpose of section 1983 was to interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the

people's federal rights to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under the color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial,' "72 and that protection from state judiciaries hostile to
Chief Justice wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices White and Blackmun; and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
68. Id. at 227. Although the Court did not explain what the "inconclusive"
proceedings were, it seems likely that some part of the quasi-criminal nuisance action
was still pending against Mitchum in state court. Otherwise, the case would have
provided a vehicle for deciding the more momentous question of Younger's applicability
when state proceedings were not pending against the federal plaintiff. Even if the Court
had desired to further postpone decision of that issue, it would probably have expressly
remarked on its presence in the case.
69. Id. at 243, rev'g 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970). The Act permits federal
injunctions against state court proceedings where such relief is "expressly authorized by
Act of Congress." See note 24 supra.
70. In order to qualify as a law which expressly authorizes injunctive relief against
state proceedings, the statute in question need not make reference to the Anti-Injunction
Act, nor must it grant authority for injunctions by its own terms. The crucial inquiry is
whether the statute "created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable
in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not
empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 237.
71. Id. at 239.
72. Id. at 242, quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (emphasis
added).
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federally guaranteed liberties was of paramount concern to the statute's
draftsmen. 3
Yet having said that, the Court stepped back to emphasize that its
holding did not "question or qualify in any way" the limiting factors of
equity, comity and federalism which Younger requires to be considered

whenever injunctions are sought against state proceedings."4 In other
words, Mitchum did not decide that section 1983's unique history as a
vehicle for access to federal court entitled a plaintiff seeking injunctions
under its aegis to a less stringent application of equitable restraint principles.

It served only to get the section 1983 litigant past the threshold

obstacle of the Anti-Injunction Act, leaving him to contend with the
Younger limitations on injunctive relief. Thus circumscribed, the Mitchum ruling amounted to little more than a narrow exercise in statutory

construction and its impact on the equitable restraint doctrine has been
minimal. 75 At the same time, the Court's emphatic references to section

1983 as the source of a strong congressional policy favoring the adjudication of constitutional issues in a federal forum indicate a certain
solicitude for that policy. Justice Stewart's opinion suggested that there

may be a fourth interest which must be weighed in the balance with
those of equity, comity and federalism in determining whether equitable
73. The drafters' reasons for preferring federal court as the forum for securing
vindication of constitutional rights dre nicely encapsulated in the following excerpt from
the congressional debates:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the
county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put
under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; . . . they will be able to rise above prejudices
or bad passions or terror more easily. ...
CoNG. GLOBF, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
460 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Coburn), quoted in 407 U.S. at 241 n.31.
74. 407 U.S. at 243. Justice Stewart noted in passing that Younger had been
decided in the context of state criminal prosecutions. Id. The choice of the prosecutor
in Mitchum to bring civil nuisance proceedings against the bookstore owner gave the
Court an opportunitiy to decide the applicability of Younger to either civil actions
generally or those brought as part of the criminal law enforcement process. The Court
passed by the issue, although the Chief Justice recommended that it be reached by the
district court on remand. Id. at 244. Three more cases would present the question of
Younger's relevance in the civil context, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973);
Speight v. Slaton, 365 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1973), vacated per curiam, 415 U.S. 333
(1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 418 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3 (1975), before the Court made its first
definitive pronouncement on the subject in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975). See notes 111-44 infra and accompanying text.
75. Courts have consistently cited Mitchum only to underscore the fact that it did
not relieve a party seeking injunctive relief from the requirements of Younger. See, e.g.,
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976): O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499
(1974); Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1206 (1972) (opinion of Rehnquist, J. in
chambers); Anonymous v. Bar Ass'n of Erie County, 515 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 71 (1975); Sorger v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 401 F.
Supp. 348, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum).

Vol. 1976:523]

EQUITABLE RESTRAINT

restraint is appropriate in a given case: the interest of the section 1983

plaintiff in securing the benefit of this congressional mandate by gaining
access to federal court for the litigation of his constitutional claims.
FederalAnticipatory Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions.
For three years after Younger was decided, another important question
lingered in its shadow, awaiting resolution: should the broad ban on

federal anticipatory remedies against pending state criminal proceedings
also be applied where prosecution is threatened but not pending at the
time federal suit is filed? Various members of the Court had expressed
differing views on the issue76 and its treatment in the lower courts was
likewise inconclusive. 77 The Court finally dropped the other shoe in

1974, holding in Steffel v. Thompson7" that federal courts may issue
declaratory judgments concerning the constitutionality of a criminal
statute at the behest of persons under a "genuine threat" of prosecution
for violating it, provided no prosecution is pending in state court at the

time federal relief is sought.79
Steffel and a companion had been twice threatened with arrest
under Georgia's criminal trespass statute8 0 for distributing antiwar handbills on the exterior sidewalk of an Atlanta shopping center. He
desisted after the second warning, but his companion continued to
ignore the warnings and was arrested. Steffel filed a section 1983

action seeking a declaratory judgment that the threatened application of
the statute to his expressive conduct deterred him from exercising his

first amendment rights.8 "

Both lower courts refused this request, rea-

soning that in the absence of a showing of bad faith or other extraordi76. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (majority opinion of White,
J.); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (majority opinion of
Brennan, J.); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
77. Compare Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), with Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826,
832 (lst Cir. 1972).
78. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
79. id. at 475. Injunctive relief, however, will apparently not be permitted in the
same situation. See note 85 infra.
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1503 (1972).
81. The parties stipulated that Steffel might be prosecuted if he were to resume
handbilling at the shopping center. 415 U.S. at 456. Steffel's arrested companion was a
co-plaintiff in the federal suit, which also asked the court to enjoin her prosecution and
efforts to enforce the statute against him. The district court denied declaratory and
injunctive relief to all parties. Only Steffel appealed the judgment, and he decided not
to contest refusal of the injunction, limiting his appeal to the denial of declaratory
relief. Id. nn.5 & 6.
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nary circumstances, Younger prohibited declaratory relief even where
prosecution was not actually pending.8 2 The Supreme Court reversed
s3
in a unanimous decision.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court largely incorporates the
views he expressed three years earlier in Perez. 4 After reasserting the
Samuels conclusion that declaratory judgments normally work the same
disturbance on pending proceedings as injunctions, he catalogued the
factors that serve to dissipate those disruptions when no action has been
brought in state court:
[P]rinciples of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the
absence of a pending state proceeding.' . . . When no state criminal
proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal
intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption
of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. In addition, while
a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete
opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part
of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending
may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in
a criminal proceeding. 85
Drawing on the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 6
82. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 334 F. Supp. 1386
(N.D. Ga. 1971).
83. Part I of the opinion took note of the intervening withdrawal of American
military forces from Southeast Asia, and directed the lower court on remand to
determine if a "case or controversy" still existed between Steffel and the authorities in
light of that development. 415 U.S. at 458-60.
84. See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
85. 415 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted). The repeated use of "intervention" here is
somewhat misleading, for the decision is plainly not authority for the issuance of both
declaratory and injunctive relief in this context. Steffel establishes only that declaratory
judgment may be granted when no prosecution is pending. The Court noted that
injunctions to forestall prosecutions for past conduct that were "imminent, but not yet
pending" had not been allowed in previous cases, but did not reach that question since it
had not been raised on appeal. Id. at 463 & n.12. However, it also noted that
injunctive relief may be appropriate in cases where, although criminal proceedings
agpinst him are not imminent, the federal plaintiff is able to show that he can avoid arrest
only by forgoing constitutionally protected activity. Id. That was precisely the claim
made by Steffel's complaint in the district court, and it is possible that the Court would
also have reversed the lower courts' denial of an injunction had he presented the issue on
appeal. See note 81 supra. However, the repeated emphasis placed on the desirability
of declaratory judgments as a milder alternative to "the strong medicine of the injunction" suggests a contrary conclusion. 415 U.S. at 466, 467-71.
86. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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Justice Brennan recounted the widespread hostility which existed before
its enactment to the use of federal injunctions as devices for testing the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. Courts were reluctant to enjoin
the enforcement of a law pending completion of a challenge to its
constitutional validity,87 and the prospective actor was forced to meet
the rigorous irreparable injury test to get an injunction even if the court
was otherwise willing to issue one. 88 According to Justice Brennan,
when Congress passed the Act in 1934 it intended not only to provide
the milder declaratory remedy as an alternative to the injunction, but to
ration its availability by a standard less stringent than the traditional
yardstick of irreparable injury.8"
On the basis of this latter finding, the Court rejected the court of
appeals' ruling that a showing of irreparable injury was required before
a declaratory judgment plaintiff was entitled to relief. Imposing such a
requirement would, in the Court's view, be inconsistent with the terms
of the Act, which states only that the plaintiff must present an "actual
controversy,"90 and would "defy Congress' intent to make declaratory
'
relief available in cases where an injunction would be inappropriate."91
Here the requisite controversy was found in the authorities' threats to
arrest Steffel, threats whose authenticity were bolstered by the actual
arrest of his companion. 92 Justice Stewart's concurrence, however,
cautioned that one's mere subjective belief that an anticipated course of
conduct may be punishable under a statute does not provide the level of
controversy which would entitle him to a declaration as to its constitutional validity, and that cases in which a sufficiently genuine threat can
be shown will be "exceedingly rare." 3
87. Professor Borchard, the principal draftsman of the Act, described the dilemma
created by this distaste for injunctive relief in the following piquant language: "The
court, in effect, by refusing an injunction informs the prospective victim that the only
way to determine whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it."
Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1928) (written statement of Professor Borchard), quoted in 415
U.S. at 468 n.18.
88. 415 U.S. at 466.
89. Id.

90. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
91. 415 U.S. at 471.
92. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
93. 415 U.S. at 476. It is unclear on the face of Justice Stewart's brief opinion
exactly how close to the line of actual prosecution a party will have to tread in order to
successfully invoke the declaratory judgment jurisdiction. In this case, the plaintiff
actually carried out the proscribed activity; he was saved from arrest only by the
discretion of a policeman who appreciated his obedience to a request to "move on."
Given the principal purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act-the creation of a
mechanism for obtaining a declaration of the law's meaning and validity before one runs
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Finally, Justice Brennan observed that where no proceedings were
pending in state court, a refusal to entertain a declaratory judgment
action grounded on section 1983 would amount to judicial disregard of
the jurisdictional obligation which that statute confers on federal courts.
Emphasizing "the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal
courts to protect constitutional rights," he said that "[r]equiring the
federal courts totally to step aside when no state criminal prosecution is
pending against the [section 1983] plaintiff would turn federalism on its
head." 4 The argument is a compelling one. Due respect for the
integrity of state judiciaries and adequate protection of their independence as arms of coordinate governments are assured by the AntiInjunction Act and the equitable restraint principles set forth in Younger. Federalism would indeed be a one-way street if a federal court,
asked to adjudicate a federal claim and administer a federal remedy,
were required to stay its hand in anticipation of state court proceedings
that might never be brought.
The Steffel opinion provides the first clear indication that the Court
was conducting an individual evaluation of the federal plaintiff's interest
in access to federal court, and measuring that interest together with
those of equity, comity and federalism as it considered the applicability
of equitable restraint. The Court undertook a meticulous assessment of
the three Younger interests and found them to be of diminished significance in the absence of a pending prosecution. On the other hand, it
correctly discerned the urgency of the section 1983 plaintiff's need for
federal declaratory relief when there was no state proceeding available
for the resolution of his constitutional claims, and it gave due recognition to the congressional policy supporting access to a federal forum
which is implicit in section 1983. At least where the more moderate
declaratory remedy is concerned, the balance which Steffel strikes between the weakened state interests and the more pressing interest of the
federal litigant is eminently sound.
The concurring opinions of Justices White and Rehnquist reveal
continuing disagreement within the Court concerning an issue which
afoul of it-a requirement that the federal plaintiff put himself directly at risk of arrest
before he may have a declaratory judgment seems inconsistent with the congressional design. A showing that the authorities have apprised the plaintiff of their intent to prosecute him if he violates the contested statute, and that he actually would follow that course
but for his fear of prosecution, should suffice. Professor Wright has suggested that the
test be whether there is "a real controversy between parties having adverse legal interests
of such immediacy and reality as to warrant a declaratory judgment." C. WRiGrr, supra
note 24, § 100 at 447.
94. 415 U.S. at 472-73.
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had been glossed over in Samuels: the propriety of granting an

injunction to secure state compliance with a previously issued federal
declaratory judgment.9 5 Pointing out that the Declaratory Judgment
Act provides for "[flurther necessary or proper relief . . . against any
adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment,"' 6
Justice White added that the "protect or effectuate its judgment" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act further empowered federal courts to

enjoin relitigation in state court of matters they had previously decided.97 These factors persuaded him that injunctions could issue against
prosecutors and courts who persisted in initiating prosecutions under a
statute in the face of a federal declaration of the law's unconstitutionality." The sounder view is that expressed by Justice Rehnquist, who
observed that a policy which in effect treated declaratory judgments as a

"giant step" toward later injunctive relief would not only blur the
distinctive character of the former as a milder, less intrusive remedy, but

would also slight Younger's policy against such injunctions."
95. In Samuels, Justice Black had observed only that a declaratory judgment "might
serve as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings to 'protect or
effectuate' the declaratory judgment .... ." 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (emphasis added);
see note 54 supra and accompanying text. No precedent was cited to support his
supposition, but it was reiterated in the same ambiguous terms by the majority opinion in
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 461 n. 11.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970).
97. This "relitigation exception" has been widely recognized by the courts, which
tend to treat it as a branch of the Act's express "protect or effectuate" exception. See,
e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125, 130
(5th Cir. 1975); C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 47 at 180 & n.24.
98. 415 U.S. at 477-78.
99. Id. at 480-83. Though no rejoinder was offered to Justice White's point about
the Anti-Injunction Act, a sufficient response is implicit in the holding of Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). There the Court recognized that while injunctive relief
under section 1983 was permissible because the statute falls within the Act's "expressly
authorized" exception, the decision to grant injunctions must ultimately be controlled by
principles of comity and federalism. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, the fact that injunctions might in theory be permissible to coerce compliance
with prior declaratory judgments under the "protect or effectuate" exception to the Act
does not mandate the conclusion that injunctive relief should be granted, for the
injunction is no less offensive to those same principles simply because it is authorized by
a different exception to the Act. It would appear that the integrity of the declaratory
judgment can be assured almost as effectively by granting it res judicata effect in any
subsequent state proceedings, with correspondingly less damage to the sensitive relations
between federal and state courts. See note 55 supra.
Justice White's concurrence also contained an observation which foreshadowed his
majority opinion in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Steffel, he suggested
that when a federal suit for anticipatory relief was "sufficiently far along," the later
commencement of state criminal proceedings would not necessarily trigger Younger's ban
on federal intervention so as to oust the federal court of jurisdiction; "ordinary consideration of economy" would make dismissal of the federal suit unwise. 415 U.S. at 478. In
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Whether or not the declaratory judgments permitted by Steffel may
be enforced by subsequently issued injunctions, it seems likely that a suit
which from the outset seeks permanent injunctive relief against threatened state prosecutions will be s.ubject to dismissal on equitable restraint
grounds. Though the Court has not expressly resolved the issue, its
decision in O'Shea v. Littleton'"0 tends to buttress this conclusion.
O'Shea involved an attempt by persons against whom no prosecutions
were pending to obtain an injunction against the continuation of racially
discriminatory practices within a county criminal justice system. The
complaint alleged inter alia that laws were being enforced selectively
against citizens who were active in the promotion of civil rights, and that
the local courts imposed higher bail and longer sentences on black
defendants than on their white counterparts."0 ' The Court reversed the
court of appeals' approval of injunctive relief primarily on the ground
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, 102 but its alternative holding
was that federal equitable intervention would have been improper in any
event. Because an injunction against future misconduct by state prosecutors and judges would require continuous monitoring of their actions
to ensure compliance, it would amount to "nothing less than an ongoing
federal audit of state criminal proceedings . .

.

. [an] abrasive and un-

intercession"' 0'

manageable
in the state's affairs that would be as disruptive of federalism and comity as the injunctions against pending
proceedings forbidden by Younger.
None of the O'Shea plaintiffs had been expressly warned that they
were about to be prosecuted, and the Court's opinion offers no direct
comment about the permissibility of injunctions against prosecutions
which have actually been threatened. However, the repeated emphasis
which the Ste fel Court placed on the harsher and more disruptive
character of injunctive relief lends support to the inference that equitable restraint principles will also be applied to limit the availability of
permanent 104 injunctions against future state court proceedings. 1 5
Hicks, Justice White (joined by four others) asserted the converse proposition, that
where the federal case was not "sufficiently far along"-i.e., when the state commenced
its prosecution before there had been "proceedings of substance on the merits" in federal
court-then Younger required dismissal of the federal suit. Id. at 348-49. See notes
145-79 infra and accompanying text.

100. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
101. Id. at 490-92.
102. Id. at 493-99.
103. Id. at 500, 504.
104. A permanent injunction would prohibit the state from initiating prosecution at
all, and would thus seem nearly as disruptive of federalism and comity as one issued after
prosecution was underway. The Court is apparently less reluctant to countenance the use
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By the conclusion of the Supreme Court's 1973 term, the contours
of the equitable restraint doctrine had begun to emerge from its tene-

brous origins in the Younger opinions. Thus far, the Court had established that where pending state criminal proceedings were involved,
neither declaratory nor injunctive relief could be granted by federal
courts unless the plaintiff could prove official bad faith or harassment,
the flagrant unconstitutionality of the statute under which he was being

prosecuted, or other extraordinary circumstances justifying federal intervention. 100

However, the less intrusive declaratory remedy could be

had without such a showing if the federal plaintiff filed suit at a time
when no criminal prosecution was pending against him. 1 0 7 The availability of injunctive relief in the absence of a pending proceeding remained an unsettled question, although there was some indication that
its more abrasive nature might require that it be withheld even when

there were no ongoing proceedings in state court. 08

Finally, while

section 1983 had been recognized as an exception to the Anti-Injunction

Act, actions for injunctive relief brought under section 1983 were still
subject to the strictures of equitable restraint. 09 Despite these developof preliminary injunctions (which only temporarily prevent the state from bringing
criminal proceedings) when such relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to
plaintiffs in federal declaratory judgment actions. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922 (1975), the Court upheld the issuance of preliminary injunctions which prohibited
local authorities from initiating prosecutions against the owners of topless bars under an
anti-topless ordinance until completion of the owners' federal court suit for declaratory
relief. The Court found the requisite threat of irreparable injury in owners' allegations
that they would suffer substantial business losses, and possibly bankruptcy, if they were
denied preliminary relief. Id. at 932. It was undoubtedly influenced as well by the
manifest overbreadth of the ordinance, which forbade women to bare their breasts in "any
public place." The Court quoted the district court's observation that this language would
encompass such unquestionably protected activity as a performance by the Ballet
Africains. Id. at 933. The preliminary injunction puts a smaller strain on federalism
insofar as it merely postpones prosecution and leaves the state free to proceed if the
federal declaratory judgment is unfavorable to the plaintiffs. At the same time, it offers
needed protection to those who begin federal suits for declaratory relief and then find
themselves faced with the injurious effect of a simultaneous prosecution. The Salem Inn
case is discussed in The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAv. L. REv. 47, 165-67
(1975).
105. Most lower federal courts have so interpreted O'Shea. See, e.g., Bonner v.
Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1418,
rehearing denied, 96 S. Ct. 1525 (1976). But see Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp.
1381 (D.N.H. 1976) (three-judge court) (granting injunction against all future prosecutions under state statute which prohibited covering of motto on auto license plates).
106. See notes 17-62 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 76-99 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 100-05 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text.
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ments, significant gaps remained to be bridged before the full scope of
the doctrine would be apparent.
RECENT EXTENSIONS OF THE EQUITABLE

RESTRAINT DOCTRINE

The applicability of equitable restraint to non-criminal court proceedings had not been authoritatively resolved by the spate of lower
court decisions dealing with the issue,110 nor was it clear whether
invocation of the doctrine was appropriate in the context of such nonjudicial matters as actions by state executive officers. The question of
Younger's relevance to proceedings in courts other than those of the
states had not yet been broached. Lastly, it was not entirely clear
whether the rule of timing suggested by Steffel-i.e., that federal relief
is available if it is sought before the initiation of proceedings in state
court-would be applied rigidly or flexibly. The Supreme Court decided each of these issues during its 1974 and 1975 terms. On the whole,
these most recent decisions wrought sweeping extensions of the equitable restraint doctrine. The holdings and their implications are indicative of an increasingly absolute policy against federal court intervention
in the processes of other governmental units, one that overprotects
interests far less compelling than those which concerned the Court in
Younger and severely undermines the congressional policies manifested
in section 1983.
Non-CriminalProceedings
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,"' the Supreme Court placed its
imprimatur on earlier lower court decisions which had applied the
equitable restraint doctrine to civil state court proceedings of a quasicriminal nature." 2 It did so in a manner which left little doubt about
110. See note 112 infra.
111. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
112. Cases decided in the circuit and district courts between 1971 and 1974 had
begun to expand the equitable restraint doctrine into the nebulous area beyond the

criminal prosecution context addressed by Younger. The early cases first extended the
doctrine to quasi-criminal actions in state courts--civil suits initiated by prosecutors that
were designed to force compliance with standards established by the state's criminal code
through measures less drastic than the penal sanction. These actions were most often
directed at purveyors of pornography in attempts to close their businesses as public
nuisances. See, e.g., Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972); Classic
Distributors, Inc. v. Zimmerman, 387 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court);
General Corp. v. Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (three-judge court),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799

(1975), on remand, 523 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1975); Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101
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its willingness to extend the doctrine to purely civil proceedings as well.
The controversy arose when a local prosecutor sought to close an adult
(N.D. Ga. 1973), vacated per curiam, 415 U.S. 333 (1974). See also Henkel v.
Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973) (civil contempt proceeding characterized as
quasi-criminal for Younger purposes because of possible sentence of imprisonment);
Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing to disturb state injunction which
barred non-student antiwar organizers from state university campus in anticipatory
enforcement of criminal trespass statutes).
Equitable restraint has also been relied upon to forbid federal intervention in
disbarment proceedings. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Batisti, 472 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1972) cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 889 (1972). Though clearly not part of the normal process of criminal law
enforcement, the characterization of bar association disciplinary proceedings as quasicriminal has been accepted by the Supreme Court. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551
(1968). The analogy to the criminal process may be justified on three grounds. First,
the misconduct punished often involves moral turpitude no different in kind or degree
from that punished in the criminal courts (e.g., embezzlement of funds held on behalf of
a client). Second, the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the bar is "at least
as great" as that involved in other quasi-criminal actions where Younger has been
applied, and federal court intervention would cause an equally objectionable disruption.
Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975). Third, the sanctions of suspension or
disbarment are often more severe than the monetary fines imposed in other quasicriminal actions, since they strip the attorney of his ability to earn a living in the
profession for which he has trained. See Erdmann, 458 F.2d at 1209-10. Once
initiated, disciplinary actions have also been treated as "pending judicial proceedings"
within the meaning of Younger even when conducted by bar association grievance
committees, on the theory that these bodies are acting as arms of the court which is
utlimately responsible for supervision of the profession. See Anonymous, 515 F.2d at
433. The doctrine seems equally applicable to disciplinary actions against other skilled
practitioners whose competence is initially certified by the state and subject to continuing
oversight (e.g., architects, accountants, licensed health care providers).
Several lower courts have gone so far as to apply equitable restraint principles to
purely civil actions. In some cases, the pending state court suit was initiated by the
state. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974) (ward-of-the-court
proceedings aimed at removing children from parents' custody); Lynch v. Snepp, 472
F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974) (court order barring nonstudents from public school grounds in racially troubled school district). In others, the
action sought to be enjoined was between private parties alone; the state was not involved
at all in the litigation. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc.,
498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974) (private antitrust suit;
alternative holding); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, Inc. 483 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1973) (maritime labor dispute); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.),
applicationfor stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (controversy between rival state delegations to national political convention). But see Blouin v.
Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir.), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (refusing
to apply equitable restraint to action for non-support brought by ex-wives against
husbands on ground that the doctrine should be limited to "traditionally criminal
proceedings"). For a discussion of the desirability of extending the equitable restraint
doctrine to civil litigation, see notes 136-43 infra and accompanying text.
Many of the pre-1975 decisions dealing with non-criminal judicial proceedings are
discussed in Comment, The Extension of Younger v. Harris to Non-Criminal Cases, 8
CamOroN L. REv. 454 (1974).
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theater operated by Pursue through civil proceedings brought under
Ohio's public nuisance law. " 3 After the state trial court issued an order
which directed that the theater be closed and prohibited its use "for any
purpose" for one year," 4 Pursue filed suit in federal court under section
1983, seeking both a declaratory judgment that the statute constituted a
prior restraint on protected activity and a permanent injunction against
its enforcement. A three-judge district court, without considering the
possible applicability of Younger, declared the law to be an invalid prior
restraint to the extent that it prohibited the exhibition of films which had
not been previously adjudged obscene in an adversary proceeding, and
enjoined enforcement of that part of the state court order which imposed
such an unconstitutional prohibition."' On direct appeal the Supreme
Court vacated the district court decree and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Younger and an intervening state supreme
court decision which had given a narrowing construction to the statute
in question." 6
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the six-man majority approached
the principal issue from the same direction as had earlier lower court
opinions," 7 analogizing this civil proceeding to the criminal prosecutions protected by Younger rather than analyzing the validity of any
general distinctions between civil and criminal actions." 8 Federalism
and comity are offended by federal interference with any state judicial
proceeding, Justice Rehnquist declared, because intervention obstructs
the state's pursuit of its substantive policies, preempts the state's own
judicial mechanism for evaluating constitutional objections to those
policies, duplicates proceedings already underway in state court, and
disparages the state court's ability to correctly resolve constitutional
issues." 9 The Court acknowledged that the maxim of equity which
cautions against interruption of the criminal process was inapplicable in
the civil context, but stressed the similarity of the nuisance action to
regular prosecutions:
[W]hatever may be the weight attached to ,this factor in civil litigation
involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding which
113. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01 -.06 (Page 1971).

114. 420 U.S. at 598.
115. Id. at 598-99. The opinion of the district court was not reported.
116. Id. at 612, citing State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled
"Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974). The Supreme Court
later dismissed an appeal of this case. Art Theater Guild v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923

(1975).
117. See note 112 supra.
118. See id.

119. 420 U.S. at 604.
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in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are
most civil cases. The State is a party to the

. .

proceeding, and the

proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes which
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. Thus, an offense to
the State's interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit
as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding . .

.

. [W]hile

•. .
*the District Court's injunction has not directly disrupted Ohio's
criminal justice system, it has disrupted that State's efforts to protect
the very interests which underlie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal
20
laws.'
The only specific basis of distinction advanced to justify restricting
Younger to conventional criminal proceedings was quickly brushed
aside by Justice Rehnquist. Pursue had argued that the danger of
constitutional error in state criminal proceedings was mitigated by federal habeas corpus review, and that the lack of similar safeguards in civil
actions warranted greater access to federal courts than Younger afforded
in criminal prosecutions. The Court responded that ultimate federal
review of constitutional questions raised in such proceedings was available via appeal to the Supreme Court from the highest state tribunal, and
that even if there is a right to have federal issues heard in a federal
forum, that right may not be exercised until the "state litigant. . . seeks
to relitigate a federal issue adversely determined in completed state
proceedings.''
Huffman's alternative holding imposed a further limitation on
federal anticipatory relief: unless the case clearly falls within one of
the exceptions to Younger, federal court intervention is barred until the
would-be plaintiff has exhausted his state appellate remedies. 22 The
120. Id. at 604-05 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 605-06 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist's second point is a piece
of logical legerdemain which offers meager assurance to plaintiffs in Pursue's position.
Attempts to relitigate constitutional issues previously decided in state civil actions may
very well be barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; indeed, the Court admits as
much. Id. n.18. It is, however, far from clear what res judicata effect should be given
to state court judgments when their constitutional validity is collaterally attacked in
federal actions brought under section 1983.

See generally Note, Relationship of Federal

and State Courts-Lombard v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), 88
HAIv. L. REv. 453 (1974). These principles do not operate in federal habeas review of
criminal convictions where there is both statutory and case authority for de novo
findings of fact and determinations of law by the federal court.

See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) (8) (1970); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
122. 420 U.S. at 608. The Court reached somewhat beyond the facts before it in
addressing the exhaustion question. Pursue's federal complaint had been filed before any
attempt was made to perfect an appeal in state court. By the time the federal injunction
had been granted, however, the judgment against Pursue apparently became final and
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majority observed that declaratory or injunctive relief, granted after the
state trial but before appellate review, would bring about "[v]irtually all
of the evils at which Younger is directed"' 23-- duplication of judicial
effort, disruption of state law enforcement, and disparagement of the
state courts' abilities. Indeed, post-trial intervention would offend yet
another state interest: the power of state appellate courts to oversee
and correct the disposition of constitutional questions by trial courts
under their supervision.1 24 Anticipatory relief prior to the exhaustion
of appellate remedies is not justified merely because the federal plaintiff
fears that the state's higher courts will reject his constitutional claims. If
previous decisions of the appellate court which induce that fear are
constitutionally sound, the litigant will be no better off in federal court;
if they are not, comity requires that the state court be given the opportu125
nity to rectify its error.
In dissent Justice Brennan characterized the majority's disposition
as "obviously only the first step toward extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding of Younger.... ,,12 Emphasizing the relative ease with which civil actions can be initiated and the absence of
procedural checks (such as arrest, arraignment, information or indictment) which discourage spurious criminal prosecutions, he feared that
the application of equitable restraint rules in the quasi-criminal realm
would "arm [prosecutors] . . . with an easily wielded weapon to strip

[the federal plaintiff] of a forum and a remedy that federal statutes
were enacted to assure him.' 27 Justice Brennan claimed that federal
courts are virtually obliged to exercise their jurisdiction under section
1983, save in the context of pending criminal proceedings, where this
congressional mandate is overborne by the more compelling concern for
federalism. 28 Moreover, banning intervention under section 1983 in
non-criminal actions would nullify Mitchum's express recognition of
section 1983's status as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 129
Finally, the dissent took issue with the exhaustion requirement imposed
nonappealable under Ohio law. Id. On remand, therefore, Pursue would have been
unable to satisfy the Court's new exhaustion requirement since it had lost the right to
state appellate relief. Cf. id. at 611 n.22.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 609.
125. See Id. at 610-11.
126, Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
127, Id. at 615.
128. See id. at 613-14, 617. Earlier decisions of the Court had also stressed the role
of section 1983 as a statutory guarantor of access to federal court See notes 71-73, 94
supra and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 615, 618. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text.
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by the majority. Justice Brennan observed that the possibility of Supreme Court review of a state court judgment was "'an inadequate
substitute for the initial District Court determination . . . to which the
litigant is entitled in the federal courts . . . ,' "10 and argued that the
new requirement ignored earlier decisions of the Court which had held
that federal plaintiffs suing under section 1983 need not exhaust their
131
state remedies first.
In terms of the interests which Younger seeks to protect, the result
reached by the Huffman majority is proper. The applicability of equitable restraint principles to a given fact situation is most aptly determined
through a process of balancing the competing interests at stake, and in
the context of state-initiated civil proceedings which seek to vindicate
policies reflected in a state's criminal laws, the balance is clearly weighted in the state's favor. The root premise of Younger is that criminal
law enforcement is an activity of paramount importance to a state, and
that its effectiveness will be severely impeded if it is routinely interrupted by the declaratory or injunctive decrees of a federal court. This
precept applies with equal force whether a prosecutor proceeds through
a purely criminal action or a quasi-criminal civil suit in his attempts to
secure compliance with the norms embodied in proscriptive statutes. A
rule which conditions the availability of federal relief on the prosecutor's
choice of enforcement techniques not only overlooks this fact, but also
intrudes indirectly upon the official discretion which is essential to an
even-handed administration of a state's criminal justice system.132 The
Court's extension of the equitable restraint doctrine to quasi-criminal
actions takes full account of these strong federalism interests. The
factor of comity is a constant in the equation, since some suspicion of
state courts as constitutional adjudicators is implied whenever federal
courts intervene in ongoing state proceedings. Though the Court's
opinion hints that the traditional equity rule against enjoining criminal
prosecutions has doubtful significance in the civil-as-criminal setting,
the identity of purpose between quasi-criminal suits and ordinary prosecutions entitles the maxim to some weight in the Huffman context.
The interests of the federal plaintiff must be assessed against these
formidable state interests. It may well be true in a given case that the
plaintiff's chances for success are more auspicious in a federal forum
than they would be in state court. Lay judges are not uncommon in
130. Id. at 617, quoting England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 416 (1964).

131. 420 U.S. at 617.
132. See note 32 supra and accompanying text,
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state trial courts, and they may be ill-equipped to deal with the subtleties
of constitutional law; elected judges may decide obscenity nuisance cases
with one eye on the first amendment and another on the electorate;
appointed judges without life tenure may be reluctant to interfere with
the policy objectives of state executives to whom they must look for
reappointment. But, despite the absence of these systemic flaws in the
federal judiciary, there may also be judges on the federal bench whose
impartiality is displaced by personal values or other factors that make
them no more receptive to libertarian pleas than the hypothetical state
jurists just described. The general assumption which underlies the
doctrine of comity, however, is that most judges in both systems are
persons of learning and fairness, and that in the vast majority of cases
the would-be federal plaintiff will be just as well off raising his constitutional claims in state court. 13 3 The competing interest of the plaintiff
must therefore not be viewed as one which arises from his need for a
"safer" federal forum. Rather, it is derived from the congressional
policy, embodied in section 1983, which favors the resolution of constitutional claims in a federal forum. Extension of the equitable restraint
doctrine to section 1983 suits for relief against quasi-criminal actions
derogates this policy; but it is also subordinated-with good reason-to
the needs of the traditional criminal process by the Younger rule.
Given the unity of state purpose in both settings and the fact that
cognate state interests are involved in each case, a refusal to apply
equitable restraint principles to state quasi-criminal actions would have
been tantamount to a repudiation of Younger.
For the same reasons, it is difficult to construct a criticism of
Huffman's exhaustion requirement which is consistent with the Younger
rationale. Since more than ninety percent of all requests for review are
dismissed by the Supreme Court, 134 the dissent's point that the possibility of such review is an inadequate substitute for initial district court
adjudication is well taken. But adequate access is only important if one
accepts the premise underlying this argument, that federal intervention
is more desirable than equitable restraint in quasi-criminal cases (in
other words, that the congressional policy expressed in section 1983 is
entitled to greater weight than the interests of equity, comity and
federalism). Here, too, the strong similarities between the traditional
criminal prosecution and the civil action "in aid of and closely related
133. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1974).
134. See Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J.LEGAL
STUDIeS

339, 361, 367 (1974).
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to" enforcement of criminal statutes militate against such a result. 1" 5
The Huffman decision thus represents an appropriate expansion of

the doctrine of equitable restraint, recognizing that there is little basis
for distinguishing quasi-criminal suits from the ordinary criminal
process which Younger insulates from federal intervention.' 36 Lan135. It is somewhat surprising that Justice Brennan would have much quarrel with the
requirement that the subject of a pending state quasi-criminal proceeding exhaust his
state appellate remedies before seeking federal relief, since his concurrence in Younger
flatly stated that this was the preferred method in criminal cases, even though the
Younger majority did not address the issue. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 57 n.*
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concern for the lack of criminal
procedural safeguards in quasi-criminal suits, see note 127 supra and accompanying text,
is also open to challenge. He feared, for example, that spurious actions might more
easily be brought in quasi-criminal cases since they are set in motion "by the mere filing
of the complaint in state court," 420 U.S. at 616. Yet most ordinary criminal
prosecutions are begun by the filing of an information, a process which likewise leaves
the discretion of the prosecutor relatively unchecked.
It has also been argued that quasi-criminal civil suits brought with no foundation in
fact to support them can be adequately deterred by the bad faith exception to Younger.
See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. Rn-v. 47, 157-58 (1975).
136. For similar reasons, the Court has held recently that the equitable restraint
doctrine also limits the availability of federal anticipatory relief against pending proceedings in military courts-martial. In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), six
Justices joined in denying injunctive relief to an Army captain who contended that the
military courts lacked jurisdiction to try him because his offense was not "serviceconnected." As it did in Hufiman, the Court in this case reached its result through a
balancing of the interests involved. Although the criminal character of the charges
against Councilman brought into play the equity maxim against interference with
criminal actions, the Court recognized that neither federalism nor comity restrains
federal courts from enjoining prosecutions in judicial systems other than those of the
states. But it found that in the military setting, "the deficiency is supplied by factors
equally compelling." Id. at 757. The functional equivalent of a state's federalism
interest resides in the peculiar nature of the armed forces as a discrete enclave in
civilian society. Their singular need for maintaining discipline led Congress to create for
them a separate legal and judicial system which federal courts should not routinely
disrupt with injunctive decrees. Comity considerations are also presented by the
existence of this separate system; the Court felt obliged to respect the congressional
judgment that the military's trial and appellate courts would provide adequate protection
for servicemen's constitutional rights. Id. at 757-58. On the other side of the balance,
any injury sustained by the military defendant through erroneous court-martial treatment
of constitutional issues can be effectively remedied by habeas review in federal court. See
id. at 760. The Councilman decision is of interest primarily for its imaginative
application of equitable restraint interest-balancing analysis in the context of a unitary
court system, in contrast with the dual federal-state system involved in earlier cases. The
case itself is a poor vehicle for the Court's otherwise valid extension of the equitable
restraint doctrine, for there is substantial merit in Councilman's claim that the offense
with which he was charged (sale of marijuana while off post, off duty and out of
uniform) was not "service-connected" and therefore not triable by military courts under
the rule of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See 420 U.S. at 762-69
(Brennan, L, dissenting). But these difficulties of fact should not obscure the correctness of the Court's perception that principles very similar to those of comity and
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guage in the majority opinion, however, indicates that the rule may
eventually be extended to bar federal anticipatory relief in all pending

state proceedings, including civil litigation between private parties."'
While equitable restraint may be appropriate even in purely civil actions
when suit is brought by the state to enforce its statutory or regulatory
policies, a comparable extension to the area of suits between private
parties would ignore the diminished presence of those state interests
which Younger sought to protect, and would entail an unseemly disre-

gard for the congressional policy reflected in section 1983.
When a state, as plaintiff, initiates a civil action the end of which is
to compel compliance with a statutory command, agency regulation, or
other matter "intimately involved with sovereign prerogative,"' 8 nearly
all the principles which counsel toward equitable restraint in quasicriminal actions seem to apply. Only equity's historic reluctance to

intervene in criminal proceedings ceases to be relevant. Any interference with a state's enforcement of its laws or disruption of its judicial
process constitutes an offense to federalism, and comity is weakened by

any grant of federal anticipatory relief against pending proceedings.
federalism justify Councilman's general ban on federal intervention in court-martial
proceedings.
137, Although the Court expressly reserved the question of Younger's applicability to
civil litigation generally, 420 U.S. at 607, it characterized its holding as Younger's "civil
counterpart," id. at 611, and cited two lower court decisions which had extended the rule
to state civil proceedings, id. at 607: Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), in which a state had been a party; and Cousins v.
Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), application for stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), involving two private parties. Other decisions of the Court
have indicated a similar intent. As early as 1972, the Chief Justice and Justices White
and Blackmun had expressed the view that equitable restraint is "equally applicable
where state civil litigation is in progress .......
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 561 (1972) (White, J.,dissenting). Justice Rehnquist seemed of a similar
mind when he observed, "While the test to be applied may be less stringent in civil cases
than in criminal, . . . [it is] clear that the federal courts will not casually enjoin the
conduct of pending state court proceedings of either type." Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S.
1201, 1206 (1972) (opinion of Rehnquist, J. in chambers). Finally, in its most recent
application of the equitable restraint doctrine, three of these four Justices were joined by
Justices Stewart and Powell in an opinion which cited Huffman for the proposition that
the doctrine "may prevent the injunction by a federal court of a state civil proceeding
once begun." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976). Justice Blackmun dissented
in Rizzo. Id. at 381.
138. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959), in
which the Court refused to allow federal court intervention in state eminent domain
proceedings. (The propriety of equitable restraint in eminent domain proceedings has
been recognized recently by the courts. See note 144 infra.) Professor Wright has also
suggested that in the non-criminal context, nonintervention by the federal courts is
advisable when the pending action is one in which "the state, or an officer or agency of
the state, is seeking to enforce the laws of the state." C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 52.
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Whether a statute is criminal, quasi-criminal or civil should not be
decisive in assessing a state's interest in enforcing it, for it can hardly be
argued that such policy objectives as environmental control, insurance
regulation and eminent domain are so much less important to a state

than criminal law enforcement that federal interference with their implementation is tolerable per se.'3 9 Since all but the least significant of
Younger's three protected interests' 4 ° are at stake when the state sues in
its civil courts, the extension of Huffman to that setting is readily
justified.
Where pending litigation is between private citizens, however, the
balance should be struck differently.' 4 ' In this context a critical ele-

ment is missing:
policies.

the state is no longer attempting to enforce its own

Federal anticipatory relief interposes no obstacles between

state officials and the institutional realization of state policy goals, and
there is no interference with the executive discretion for which Younger
exhibited such solicitude. While federalism is affronted by any federal

disruption of an ongoing state proceeding, and judicial comity would
likewise be harmed, these interests, standing alone, ought to give way to
section 1983's guarantee of a federal forum for the vindication of
federal rights.' 4 2 At least where a state proceeding is in its early stages,

the disruption of a state court system by federal declaratory or injunctive
relief would be negligible. It may well be that the importance attached
by the state to the substantive legal matter involved cannot be deter-

mined by reference to the fact of its presence as a party in a given
139. Whitten, supra note 17, at 682.
140. The reference is to the "equity" factor, the traditional equitable axiom against
interference with criminal prosecutions which Justice Black invoked in Younger, 401
U.S. at 43-44 (1971). It has been contended that this "ancient jurisdictional shibboleth"
has little meaning in the present merged system of law and equity, and that its continued
use as a justification for equitable restraint obscures the true policy considerations which
support the doctrine. See Whitten, supra note 17, at 611-15. In any event, the maxim
ceases to be relevant as the rule of Younger is extended further outside the context of
criminal proceedings. It is more accurate to refer to the broader precept of equitable
jurisdiction that equity will not act unless the applicant has no adequate remedy at law
and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. (The Younger Court also
relied on this aspect of the equity interest. See notes 2.5-27 supra and accompanying
text.) Even this more limited formulation of the equity interest has proven less
significant than comity and federalism concerns in the analysis employed in postYounger decisions of the Court. The primary goal in these cases seems to have been the
maintenance of the delicate relationship between the state and federal governments. See,
e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238-43 (1972).
141. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
142. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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lawsuit.' 43 However, this formulation largely begs the question. It is
not the relative "seriousness" with which a state views a given policy, but
the magnitude of its own institutional stake in the enforcement of that
policy, that must govern the applicability of equitable restraint principles. Its absence as a party from a civil suit negates any inference of
such a stake, and the Younger interests should therefore be subordinated
to the congressional mandate favoring access to the federal courts
which is inherent in section 1983.111
143. Whitten, supra note 17, at 682 (giving the example of state antitrust laws which
create a private right of action).
144. In the aftermath of Huffman, most lower federal courts have read the decision
as a mandate for further extensions of the equitable restraint doctrine. The courts have
continued to deny relief from state quasi-criminal proceedings, except where the case
falls within the bad faith exception to the YoungerlHuffman rule. Anonymous v.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 122 (1975); Anonymous v. Bar Ass'n of Erie County, 515 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 71 (1975); Goodrich v. Supreme Court, 511 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.
1975); Horvath v. City of Chicago, 510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975) (Huffman distinguished); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 47-51 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
(three-judge court); Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379
(E.D. Mich. 1975). Equitable restraint has also been consistently applied to deny
anticipatory relief against pending civil proceedings which had been initiated by the state
as a means of enforcing state policy. Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1975) (eminent domain); Sorger v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 401 F. Supp.
348 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (eminent domain, dictum noting relevance of Huffman). The
doctrine has further been invoked to bar injunctive interference with state-initiated
proceedings before state administrative agencies. McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152 (2d
Cir. 1975); Do-Right Auto Sales v. Howlett, 401 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ill. 1975). A
few courts have gone beyond the limits proposed in this Comment in finding that Huffman applies "whenever any state judicial proceeding is sought to be enjoined," thus opening the door to the application of equitable restraint to civil suits between private parties.
Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff, 399 F. Supp. 409, 413 (N.D. Ohio 1975); see Williams v, Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976); Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691
(6th Cir. 1976).
Two lower courts have expressed reluctance to extend the Huffman rule beyond the
realm of quasi-criminal proceedings. In Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Recio,
520 F.2d 1342 (Ist Cir. 1975), the First Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal, on
Younger grounds, of a complaint which sought federal anticipatory relief against a civil
suit between private parties; the suit was pending in Puerto Rico's commonwealth courts.
Noting that the Younger rule had been developed in the context of criminal prosecutions
and that Huffman extended that rule to quasi-criminal actions, the court of appeals
criticized the perfunctory application of equitable restraint principles below, admonishing
the trial judge on remand to make "an assessment of the countervailing interests of the
parties . .. [and to] undertake a balancing of the equities" before it applied the
Huffman rule to purely civil litigation. Id. at 1345. The most patent example of lower
court hostility to any further extension of Huffman is found in Hernandez v. Danaher,
405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3697 (U.S. June 7, 1976). The Supreme Court has recently decided to hear an appeal
in Hernandez, and the decision seems a likely candidate for reversal. The case arose
when Illinois state officials discovered that welfare recipients had fraudulently concealed
personal financial assets in their applications for public assistance, and brought suit to
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ProceedingsNot PendingWhen FederalRelief is Sought
The Court's 1974 decision in Ste fel v. Thompson145 tied the
acceptability of federal declaratory relief to the pendency of proceedings
in state court. It seemed to establish the proposition that declaratory

judgments are not barred by considerations of equitable restraint where
there is "no state criminal proceeding . . . pending at the time the
federal complaint is filed. .... ,,14 Barely one year later, however, the
Court's decision in Hicks v. Miranda147 replaced this straightforward
standard with a far more complex and ambiguous test which is so

fundamentally at odds with the rule of Steffel as to suggest that the latter
case is now largely a dead letter.
The Hicks controversy began in November, 1973, when police
officers acting pursuant to four separate warrants seized four prints of
the film "Deep Throat" from a theater owned and operated by Miranda.

Hicks, the district attorney of Orange County, California, filed criminal
obscenity charges against two theater employees and obtained a state
court determination of the film's obscenity. Instead of appealing this
order within the state courts, 4 8 Miranda filed suit in federal district court
under section 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
His

accompanying motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on
the district court's finding of insufficient probability of success on the

merits. The federal complaint was filed on November 29, although
service on Hicks was not actually completed until January 14, 1974.
attach these assets pending the outcome of another action aimed at recouping improperly
received benefits. The welfare recipients' request for an injunction against enforcement of
the state's pre-judgment attachment law was granted 'by a three-judge district court.
Though the court found the statute's lack of procedural safeguards to be "patently violative" of the due process clause (thus bringing it within an exception to the Youngerl
Huffman rule), it also sought to distinguish Huffman on the dubious ground that the
Illinois attachment law allowed suit to be brought by private parties as well as state
officials, unlike the public nuisance statute involved in Huffman which gave an exclusive
right of action to the state. The Hernandez court concluded that the "mere happenstance" that the state was a party to the particular action before it was not enough to
warrant the application of equitable restraint principles. Id. at 760. The court's reasoning overlooks the critical fact that the instant case represented an effort by state officials
to enforce through civil measures an important state policy-the financial integrity of its
public assistance program. The state's attempt to vindicate its policies in its own civil
courts should therefore have been accorded more deference than it received.
145. See notes 76-99 supra and accompanying text.
146. 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (emphasis added).
147. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
148. This failure to pursue a state court appeal would ordinarily run afoul of the
requirement for exhaustion of state appellate remedies laid down in Huffman. See notes
122-25 supra and accompanying text. The Hicks Court, however, found it unnecessary
to reach the issue. 422 U.S. at 351 n.20.

560
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On January 15, Hicks amended the criminal complaint by adding
Miranda as a defendant in the obscenity prosecution.14 9 A three-judge
district court held that Younger did not require dismissal because no
state charges were pending against Miranda at the time his federal
complaint was filed, and because the prosecutor's conduct amounted to

a demonstration of bad faith and harassment.'" °
On direct appeal, a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed. After disposing of a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction over the appeal,"'1
Justice White's opinion for the five-man majority held that the district
court had erred in refusing to dismiss Miranda's complaint on equitable
restraint grounds. The majority found fault with the lower court's
determination that the state prosecution was not "pending" for Younger
purposes because it had not been commenced until after the federal

complaint had been filed. Contending that the question of pendency
had never been held to depend on the situation as of the day federal suit

is initiated,'"" the Court announced that a state prosecution must henceforth be considered a "pending" proceeding-thus requiring a Younger

dismissal-whenever prosecution of the federal plaintiff is commenced

"after the federal complaint is filed, but before any proceedings of
substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court . . ...

In addition, the majority suggested that a state criminal proceeding
should be treated as "pending" against a federal plaintiff, even though

he himself is not named as a defendant in the case, if his interests are
"intertwined" with the interests of the actual defendants in the prosecu149. 422 U.S. at 334-39.
150. Id. at 340. The district court's finding of bad faith was premised on its
disapproval of the "pattern of seizure" and its belief that Miranda was added as a
defendant to the criminal action in retaliation for his initiation of the federal suit. Id. at
350-51 n.19.
151. Id. at 342-48.
152. 422 U.S. at 349. In an earlier case, Justice Brennan had reserved comment
concerning the precise fact situation presented in Hicks, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
117 n.9 (1971), and also indicated that the determination of whether a state prosecution
is pending should be delayed until the time of the hearing on the federal complaint, id. at
103-04. Justice Rehnquist suggested an even later cut-off date in Stelfel, proposing that
"any arrest prior to resolution of the federal action would constitute a pending prosecution . . . ." 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). See
also note 99 supra. However, the majority opinion in Steffel clearly contemplated that
the question of a state prosecution's pendency would be settled "at the time the federal
complaint is filed," and that prosecutions commenced after that date would not force
dismissal of the federal lawsuit on equitable restraint grounds. 415 U.S. at 454, 462.
Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the Hicks majority, the definition of a "pending" proceeding was not an issue left open by prior decisions of the Court.
153. 422 U.S. at 349.
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tion. 1" Justice White noted the presence of such mutuality of interest
in Hicks, since Miranda's suit sought the return of films belonging to
him and a flat ban on the enforcement of the obscenity statute, and any
grant of relief would have directly interfered with the prosecution of his
employees (who were represented by his lawyers). 1"'5 The Court's
discussion of this alternative rationale appears to posit a three-pronged
test to be used in determining whether a federal complaint filed by one
not a party to a pending prosecution should be dismissed on equitable

restraint grounds:

(1) Is there such community of interest between

the state defendant and the federal plaintiff that the latter has a "substantial stake"15 in the outcome of the state prosecution?; (2) Would
the requested federal relief interfere with the state proceeding?; and (3)
Can the federal plaintiff's interests be fully vindicated in the state

proceeding?157 Finally, the Court rejected the district court's conclusion that Hicks had acted in bad faith, dismissing the findings of fact on
which it was based as "vague and conclusory."' 58
154. Id. at 348-49. Although the federal plaintiff in Hicks was eventually made a
defendant in the state criminal action, the Court's language supports the inference that
his suit would have been dismissed under this "intertwined interests" test whether or not
he had been added as a party to the prosecution. Justice White stated that the Younger
rule applies whenever a suit seeks federal anticipatory relief against ongoing criminal
proceedings, even though "the interference is sought by some, such as [Miranda] not
parties to the state case." Id. at 349. He cited for support Chief Justice Burger's
concurrring opinion in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 830-33 (1974), in which the
"identity of interest" between the farm workers' union (which was not a party to
criminal proceedings) and its individual members (who were) was thought to justify
requiring the union to "meet Younger standards" in order to maintain its federal suit. Id.
at 830. The Chief Justice observed that whether "it would be proper to impute the state
criminal prosecution of one who is not a federal plaintiff to one who is. . . will depend
upon facts of joint activity and common interest." Id. at 832 n.8.
155. 422 U.S. at 348-49.
156. Id. at 348.
157. See id. at 348-49; The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 159-60
n.57 (1975).
158. 422 U.S. at 350. The Court's refusal to honor the lower court's finding of bad
faith in the "pattern of seizures" conducted by Hicks seems justified. See id. at 350-51
n.19. However, Justice White offered no explanation for rejection of the finding that
Hicks was animated by a desire for retaliation when he added Miranda as a defendant to
the obscenity case on the day after he was served with the federal complaint. The
Court's failure to justify its action does not comport with the well-established principles
that trial court findings of fact are not to be disturbed on review "unless clearly
erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
In its discussion of the "pattern of seizures" condemned by the district court, the
Court made much of the fact that each search and seizure had been authorized by
warrants whose validity had not been attacked in the litigation below. Given that
authority, bad faith could not be found without "some effort . . . to impeach the
entitlement of the prosecuting officials to rely on repeated judicial authorization for their
conduct . . . ."

422 U.S. at 351.

It is possible to extrapolate from this passage a rule
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In a pointed dissent Justice Stewart assailed the Hicks majority for
creating a new definition of "pendency" which "trivializes" the Ste fel
rule."
Aside from the formidable semantic difficulties involved in
determining exactly what constitutes "proceedings of substance on the
merits,"" ' he worried that the holding would offer a temptation most

prosecutors might find hard to resist-the opportunity to divest federal
courts of jurisdiction over pending declaratory judgment suits by a
timely commencement of state criminal proceedings. 1 1 According to

Justice Stewart, the probable consequence of a rule which readily
permits state officials to lift a case out of the federal forum would be to
"[oust] the federal courts from their historic role as the 'primary
reliances' for vindicating constitutional freedoms."' 6 2 This result, in the
dissenters' view, fails to take proper account of competing federal
interests which are of equal dignity to those of the states in striking the
balance contemplated by Younger." 3
The Court's disposition of Hicks virtually emasculates the rule of
Stefel, and largely nullifies the efficacy of the declaratory judgment as
an instrument for providing advance determinations of individual rights

under contested criminal statutes.'

Since months or even years may

pass before federal docket congestion is surmounted in a given case so as
that good faith is conclusively established whenever prosecutors act pursuant to a
warrant. But Hicks should not be stretched so far. Such a reading leaves no
protection against the prosecutor who brings unfounded charges with no hope of ultimate
conviction, but who is nonetheless able to coax warrants for his purpose from a
rubberstamp magistrate. The only post-Hicks court to consider the problem has reached
a similar conclusion, insisting that the presence or absence of a warrant is only one
factor in the "entire factual context" which must be evaluated in deciding whether state
officers have acted in bad faith. Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402
F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
159. 422 U.S. at 353.
160. See id. at 353-54 n.l.
161. Id. at 357. The most obvious incentive for prosecutors to follow this course is
that it would regain the "home court advantage" for them. Instead of having to defend a
civil action in a federal forum, the prosecutor who achieves a Hicks dismissal will face
the more familiar and convenient task of prosecuting a criminal case in state court. Id.
162. Id. at 356.
163. Id.
164. Miranda had requested injunctive as well as declaratory relief; the propriety of
an injunction was not at issue in Steffel. See note 81 supra. This factual distinction,
however, is unlikely to make the Hicks case inapplicable where a suit seeking only
declaratory relief is interrupted by a subsequent state prosecution. The Hicks Court
thought the difference sufficiently trivial to merit only brief notice. 422 U.S. at 349
n.17. Moreover, the Court's implicit repudiation of Steffel (which itself involved only
declaratory relief) indicates that the new definition of a pending action is meant to apply
whether or not an injunction is also requested. See notes 165-68 infra and accompanying text.
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to permit substantial proceedings on the merits, Steffel now offers
meaningful protection against the dismissal of federal declaratory judgment suits only in the relatively rare instances where state officials have
either made a cautionary threat to prosecute the federal plaintiff if he
persists in his present activities or have delayed bringing charges far
longer than would ordinarily be the case. 1"' After Hicks, suits for
declaratory relief against criminal statutes will be in constant peril of
dismissal in the face of "pending" actions begun by prosecutors eager to
avoid civil litigation in federal court.
The majority's sweeping revision of the Ste fel doctrine is surprising, for the case could easily have been decided on narrower grounds.
Miranda's failure to appeal the state trial court's obscenity and seizure
orders justified dismissal of his federal complaint under Huffman's
requirement for exhaustion of state appellate remedies.' 6 6 Further, the
Court could have refused to treat the after-initiated state prosecution as
a "pending" proceeding (thus leaving Ste fel intact) and dismissed
Miranda under the more limited "intertwined interests" standard. 167 By
placing its principal emphasis on an expansive redefinition of pendency,
the Court left little doubt that it meant to relegate Ste fel to the realm of
"juridical cripples"' 6 s whose precedential value is slight at best.
The Hicks decision represents an unwise and unwarranted extension of the doctrine of equitable restraint. It is flawed in two important
respects. First, it imposes an additional fact-finding requirement on
district courts that are already straining under the weight of an everburgeoning workload, while providing only the most cryptic guidelines
to assist them in that process. As the dissent points out, the meaning
of "proceedings of substance on the merits" is not self-evident. Presumably, the test is double-edged: federal proceedings must be both "of
substance" and "on the merits" to avoid dismissal. 9 The Hicks district
court's denial of a temporary restraining order one month after suit was
165. A similar interpretation of Steffel's diminished scope in the wake of Hicks is
presented in 47 Miss. LI. 143, 154 (1976).
166. See note 148 supra.
167. This test seems fully consistent with settled principles of equitable restraint. If,
as in this case, a person not party to a previously inititated state prosecution has a
substantial stake in the outcome of that case which he tries to protect by seeking federal
relief that will disrupt the criminal proceeding, it would be unseemly for federal courts
to grant relief to him where Younger forbids them to grant the same relief to the

defendant in the state proceeding.

The harm to comity and federalism is not less

because it is done at the behest of a person other than the criminal defendant himself.

168. The phrase is borrowed from Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE LJ. 59.

169. 422 U.S. at 353 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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filed was tacitly treated as satisfying neither requirement, even though
the denial was grounded on a finding that Miranda had failed to show
"likelihood of prevailing on the merits.' 7 ° If preliminary judicial
hearings are not sufficient, it goes without saying that discovery activity
will similarly fall short.'7 1 Protracted in-court proceedings on such
jurisdictional questions as standing, class action certification, mootness,
and the applicability of equitable restraint itself may also be inadequate
to prevent a Hicks dismissal. Even the receipt of evidence on the merits
may not insulate a federal case from Hicks if there has not been a "substantial" investment of time by the federal court. Indeed, since actions
for anticipatory relief are sometimes tried on the briefs without hearing
(as was the case in Hicks),'7 2 a final order by the district court may be
the only tangible indication of substantial deliberation on the merits.
However the question may ultimately be resolved, it is anticipated that
lower courts will expend considerable time and effort wrestling with this
elusive standard, and that a raft of conflicting interpretations will follow
3
in its wake.'
A second and more ominous fault in the Court's decision rests in its
radical departure from the balance-of-interests analytic model developed
in Younger and succeeding cases. Nowhere does the majority opinion
attempt an assessment of the equity and federalism considerations emphasized in Younger, and it makes only a single unelaborated reference
to the factor of comity.' 7 4 As this omission suggests, a scrupulous
evaluation of state and federal interests within the traditional framework
does not support the result reached in Hicks. Younger starts with the
proposition that once a state has begun the process of enforcing its laws
in its own courts, the subsequent involvement of federal courts in the
controversy will disrupt the efficient functioning of state prosecutorial
operations, offend the constitutional presumption that state judges will
170. Id. at 353-54 n.l.
171. Discovery is apt to be much less extensive in criminal prosecutions than it is in
civil trials. However, the portent of Huffman is that the equitable restraint doctrine
(including the Hicks rule) will eventually be applied to civil proceedings as well. See
notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
172. 422 U.S. at 339.
173. In practice, it will not be necessary for every court faced with this situation to
consider the dimensions of the "proceedings of substance on the merits" test. The reason
is that prosecutors served with process in a federal declaratory action will often act
quickly to initiate prosecution in state court if they intend to prosecute at all. Note,
supra note 165, at 155. However, caseload pressures and similar factors may prevent
rapid prosecutorial response in many other cases, so the anticipated burdens of the Hicks
rule are not merely hypothetical.
174. See 422 U.S. at 349.
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obey federal law, and cut against the equity tradition which forbids
intervention in criminal proceedings. 17 5 But no comparable offense to
state interests occurs when a federal court merely retains jurisdiction if
acquired before the state proceeding was initiated. It cannot be argued
that the continuation of an ongoing declaratory judgment suit in federal
court would "disrupt" a prosecution that is barely underway; at worst it
would require postponement of the state's active pursuit of its case. 17
On the contrary, it seems far more offensive to federalism to dislodge the
federal plaintiff from his chosen forum and to oust the federal court of
jurisdiction out of deference to a state prosecution. Nor is it true that
retaining a case on the federal docket reflects negatively on a state
court's ability to deal with constitutional questions. It merely respects
the obligation of the federal court under the Declaratory Judgment
Act 7 7 to apprise the federal plaintiff of his constitutional rights, an
obligation which the court incurs "from the moment its jurisdiction is
invoked.' 78 The equity maxim against interference with the criminal
process may be violated by requiring state prosecution to abide the
conclusion of a federal suit, but this factor does not in itself warrant the
utter disregard for the interests of federal courts and federal plaintiffs
which the rule of Hicks displays.
Strict adherence to Steffe's complaint-filing cutoff point does have
the "unseemly" effect of making the applicability of the equitable restraint doctrine "turn solely on the outcome of a race to the courthouse.' 79 But it has the cardinal virtue of being simple without being
simplistic. It allows district courts to determine whether a Younger dismissal is required with a quick glance at the state of the record on a fixed
date, and obviates the need for labyrinthine inquiries into whether
substantial proceedings on the merits have taken place. While Steffel
might let pass the occasional litigant who files a federal complaint to
head off a prosecution he knows to be imminent, Hicks leaves open the
175. See notes 25-32, 85 supra and accompanying text.

176. Justice Stewart observed that no Supreme Court decision requires the state to
refrain from prosecuting during the pendency of the federal case, 422 U.S. at 356;
however, the inconvenience to the federal plaintiff of having to litigate in two courtrooms at the same time would lead most federal courts to issue stays of the state
proceeding pending the completion of the federal action. See note 62 supra and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a postponing stay is far less
repugnant to principles of federalism than a prohibitive injunction.
177. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
178. 422 U.S. at 356 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

179. Id. at 354. It should be noted that the Hicks rule "does not eliminate that race;
it merely permits the State to leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first

at the finish line." Id.
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more serious possibility that prosecutors will file state charges for the
sole purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction which has already attached. The holding in Steffel resulted in part from the Court's desire
to make federal declaratory relief available to persons who, because they
are not involved in state criminal proceedings, have no alternative forum
in which to raise their constitutional claims; the after-initiated prosecution in the Hicks situation does remedy that deficiency. But
Steffel's primary importance lies in its recognition that the equitable
restraint doctrine is the product of competing state and federal interests
and that the relative weights of those interests in a given context must
control federal court decisions to dismiss or retain suits for declaratory
relief. As previously noted, the interests of equity, comity and federalism are significantly weaker when prosecution is not begun until after
federal suit is filed than they are in the traditional Younger setting.
Hicks overvalues these interests to the detriment of the more compelling
federal interests which arise from section 1983's assurance of a federal
forum and the need for unimpeded performance of the federal court's
functions under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The paucity of rational justification for the Court's action in Hicks
suggests the possibility that the majority was motivated by more than a
desire to limit the reach of Steffel so as to achieve consistency with its
earlier decisions. One explanation which may be inferred from the
trend of the Court's latest decisions in the area is that the Court has
seized on the equitable restraint doctrine as a device for rationalizing
the achievement of an institutional policy objective: reduction of the
workload in the federal courts. 180 The effect of the Hicks ruling will be
to restrict severely the availability of federal declaratory relief to those
who must act in the shadow of an arguably unconstitutional criminal
statute. The Court's abandonment of the more reasonable and workable Stefel standard is unfortunate, and it feeds the suspicion that the
interest-balancing analysis developed in the germinal cases on equitable
restraint may soon fall victim to judicially planned obsolescence.
State Executive Action

Until this year application of the equitable restraint doctrine had
been limited to the context of adjudicative proceedings in the judicial or
administrative tribunals of other governmental entities. But the Court's
180. The emphatic public pronouncements of several Justices on the need for such
reductions tend to reinforce this supposition. See, e.g., 44 U.S.L.W. 2389 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1976) (Chief Justice's annual report on the state of the judiciary); cf. Powell, Myths and
Misconceptions About the Supreme Court, 61 A.B.A.J. 1344, 1345 (1975).
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latest treatment of the doctrine in Rizzo v. Goode181 is framed in terms
which suggest that the rule will eventually be enlarged to bar federal
injunctions directed at state and local executive officers as well. The
litigation began in 1970 when two separate class actions were filed
against the mayor, police commissioner, and other senior officials of the
Philadelphia city government. The suits alleged that the defendants
had condoned widespread police mistreatment of minority group members." 2 After the two cases were consolidated for hearing and "a
staggering amount of evidence" was received in proceedings which lasted
nearly a month, 83 the district court found no indication of an affirmative high-level policy to disregard the rights of blacks. But it did
conclude that Rizzo and the other officials had instituted procedures
within the department which tended to discourage the filing of citizen
complaints and to insulate police officers from punishment for such
misconduct, and that they had done nothing to prevent its recurrence
despite frequent requests for corrective action."' To remedy the situation, the court issued an injunction which directed the defendants to
draft for the court's approval a program for "dealing adequately with
civilian complaints."'8 5 The court's guidelines for an acceptable plan
included suggestions that the officials rewrite department training manuals and regulations to provide detailed standards for police dealings
with citizens, revise procedures for handling civilian complaints to ensure the full and fair disposition of meritorious grievances, and give
notice of the disposition to the complainants.'8 0 The order was affirmed on appeal by the Third Circuit, 8 7 but the Supreme Court
reversed on a writ of certiorari in a 5-3 decision.
181.

423 U.S. 362 (1976).

182. The first suit was brought by Goode and two others. The second was filed by
four group plaintiffs: The Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the
Black Panther Party, and the Young Lords Party (members of which are of Spanish
origin). Both were certified as class actions, with the named plaintiffs representing all
Philadelphia residents and an "included" class of the city's black residents. Id. at 364-65
n.l.
183. Id. at 367.
184. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

The com-

plaint alleged a total of more than forty separate incidents of police wrongdoing, ranging
from racially derogatory remarks to physical abuse and destruction of property in the
execution of arrests and search warrants. The district court expressly found that five of
the incidents involved deprivations of constitutional rights, and that four of them
revealed no police misconduct.

No specific conclusions of law were drawn with respect

to the other incidents. Instead, the trial judge viewed them as establishing a pattern of
violations occurring "with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated

instances." Id. at 1319.
185. Id. at 1321.
186. Id.

187. 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
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Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was devoted largely to an

explication of the Court's finding that no article I case or controversy
existed' 8 and its rejection of the district court's theory of liability under
section 1983.180 But the Court's third justification for its holding was
188. 423 U.S. at 371-73. The Court cited O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
for the proposition that evidence of past exposure to official misconduct must be
accompanied by a showing of the threat of continuing injury before an article III case or
controversy is established. It found the Rizzo plaintiffs' claim of injury "even more
attenuated" than that rejected in O'Shea, because they alleged only the possibility that
unnamed policemen not parties to the suit would violate their rights in the future. 423
U.S. at 372. (The injunction in O'Shea ran against a magistrate and judge who were
individually accused of discriminatory conduct. See notes 100-03 supra and accompanying text.) Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion gave a much truer reading of O'Shea.
He correctly remarked that none of the plaintiffs there claimed to have suffered
themselves from the alleged wrongdoing, whereas each of the Rizzo plaintiffs had
claimed victimization by the challenged police practices. The district court's "detailed,
careful and sympathetic" findings of a genuine and ongoing threat of injury were entitled
to greater deference in his view. Id. at 382.
The emphasis placed on the case or controversy requirement in both Rizzo and
O'Shea is significant. It demonstrates that, when injunctive relief is sought and no state
court proceeding is either pending or threatened against the federal plaintiff, it is likely
that he will be dismissed for lack of standing even if he would otherwise be able to
convince a court that injunctive relief is permissible under the equitable restraint
doctrine. A similar but less difficult problem arises where declaratory relief against
threatened prosecutions is sought. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
189. Id. at 373-77. The district court found the number of instances involving
constitutional violations to be "unacceptably high" and suggestive of a pattern of mayoral
acquiescence in police misconduct. Justice Rehnquist treated these occurrences as de
minimis, observing that they took place "at large in a city of three million inhabitants,
with 7,500 policemen." Id. at 373. He likewise rejected the district court's premise that
refusal or failure of Rizzo et al. to take corrective action despite repeated complaints
about police abuses made equitable relief appropriate, even though no active conspiratorial design had been shown on their part. Terming this approach "an unprecedented
theory of § 1983 liability," the Court distinguished Rizzo from earlier cases in which
broad injunctive relief had been granted against state officials. Id., citing Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Those cases, said the Court,
turned on findings of a "deliberate plan by the named defendants" to deny the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. 423 U.S. at 375 (emphasis in original). Rizzo, by contrast, sought
relief against the named senior officials for wrongs peripetrated by their subordinates
without active participation or direction by the mayor and others.
The dissent found the majority's restrained interpretation of section 1983 liability
equally "unprecedented." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1971), and decisions in ten
circuit courts of appeals had established to the dissenters' satisfaction that "an official
may be enjoined from consciously permitting his subordinates, in the course of their
duties to violate the constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal." 423 U.S.
at 385 & n.2. They contended that the plain terms of section 1983, imposing liability
on every person who "subjects, or causes to be subjected" another person to deprivation
of federal rights, made actionable an official's negligent failure to prevent unconstitutional conduct on the part of his agents. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun discerned a certain "Catch-22" quality in the majority's reasoning. If injunctive
relief is available only against those who have directly participated in a scheme to deny
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that "important considerations of federalism" also required denial of
injunctive relief. 190 Noting that government agencies have traditionally
been given a wide berth by the courts in formulating their operating
policies, the majority characterized the district court's order as an "indisputably . . . sharp limitation on the department's 'latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.' """' The Court acknowledged that the
Anti-Injunction Act' 2 and the principles of equity, comity and federalism which it embodies are directly relevant only in the face of pending
state court proceedings. 9 ' But it continued with this observation:
[T]he principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments,
though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight
in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress,
have not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal
proceeding itself. We think these principles likewise have applicability
where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the
state government, but against those in charge of an executive branch
1 4
of an agency of state or local governments such as respondents here.
With this short passage, the Rizzo Court laid the groundwork for
the most radical expansion of the equitable restraint doctrine to date.
Justice Rehnquist's references to Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. and other
equitable restraint cases"9 5 fortify the impression that the Court is
the rights of others, it could only have been obtained in Rizzo against the individual
policemen on a case-by-case basis. Yet this piecemeal remedy would require precisely
the "continuing supervision by . . . federal courts of the day-to-day activities" of a
state government unit that was condemned in O'Shea. Id. at 386. Justice Blackmun
might also have added that patchwork injunctions against individual officers would be
completely ineffective to prevent violations which exist on a department-wide scale.
The Rizzo Court's close reading of section 1983 may eventually prove to be the
most harmful aspect of its holding. State government agencies are large and unresponsive as a rule, and a judicial wrist-slapping administered to a few line or mid-level
officials is unlikely to stimulate internal policy changes without the cooperation of the
agency's chief executive officer. Injunctive decrees directed at agency heads may thus be
the only effective means of ensuring that reluctant officials respect the rights of the
governed. Courts should be hesitant to grant equitable relief when a small number of
unrelated and relatively trivial violations are alleged, and they should not intervene
before state officers have had adequate opportunity to become aware of the problem and
correct it. But neither of these limiting factors was present in Rizzo, and the Court's
refusal to entertain the plaintiffs' section 1983 cause of action seems inconsistent with
the safeguarding purposes that statute was intended to serve. See notes 72-73 supra and
accompanying text.
190. 423 U.S. at 378.
191. Id. at 379, quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The text of the Act is quoted at note 24 supra.
193. 423 U.S. at 379.
194. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
195. See id.
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preparing the way for the application of Younger's rule of nonintervention to federal plaintiffs who seek injunctions against state executive
officers. If subsequent cases bear out this apprehension, Rizzo may
prove to be the first step in a wholesale renunciation of federal equitable
jurisdiction under section 1983. In practical effect, the new rule would
amount to a pro tanto judicial repeal of section 1983's "suit in equity"
provision. But the equitable restraint doctrine, designed as it was to
prevent federal interference with state courts, should not be applied as a
bar to injunctive relief against state executive officers; there are fundamental differences between the judicial and executive branches which do
not justify the Court's apparent confidence in the latter as protectors of
constitutional liberties.
As the Court recognized in Rizzo, equitable restraint is predicated
in large part on "important considerations of federalism."'19 6 The desire
to avoid disruption of state law enforcement processes takes account not
only of the state judiciary's interest in uninterrupted control of its
criminal docket, but of the executive's need for unfettered discretion in the performance of its prosecutorial function. 197 But federalism
concerns standing alone do not impel federal courts to dismiss suits
which allege infringement of constitutional rights. They do so only
where the existence of a pending action in a state judicial forum
provides an adequate opportunity for the litigant to have his federal
claims heard. The comity justification for equitable restraint appropriately recognizes that state courts are staffed by competent judges who
are under a constitutional duty to obey federal law,1"8 and that the
federal plaintiff's interests are well protected within that system.
These alternative institutional safeguards are entirely absent where
the injunction sought is directed at state executive action rather than
state judicial proceedings. When his suit is dismissed, the federal
plaintiff in such case is remitted not to another court of equal dignity,
but to the discretion (and perhaps caprice) of an executive officer who
may be unschooled in the law, who is far more susceptible to political
pressures and public outcry, and whose actions are subject to much less
review than the decisions of trial courts. Governors, mayors, and
agency heads may quite understandably perceive the protection of individual rights as subordinate to their primary management and law
enforcement responsibilities. The fact remains, however, that the dismissed federal plaintiff is left with little meaningful recourse once he is
196. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
197. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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dislodged from federal court. The recalcitrant official can hardly be
expected to be more receptive to requests for corrective action than he
was before suit was filed; indeed, he is more likely to view the federal
dismissal as a vindication of his position. Nor is there much comfort in
the assurance that the electoral process may eventually "turn the rascals
out"; it promises no immediate relief, and is irrelevant when the official
in question is a civil service employee rather than an elected officer.
Presumably, injunctive relief could be obtained in state court, and
litigating within the state system would eliminate the federalism problems posed by federal intervention. 199 But it implies no disrespect for
state judiciaries to recognize that section 1983 was enacted for the
express purpose of providing a federal forum for the adjudication of
claimed violations of federal rights by state officials." ° When section
1983 is used as a vehicle for seeking anticipatory relief against state
court proceedings, its promise of a federal forum is properly made to
yield before the important principles of equity, comity and federalism
which arise in that context. But where relief is sought against state
executive action, only federalism is offended by granting the federal
remedy. That factor should not be sufficient in and of itself to require
equitable restraint, especially in light of the dearth of alternative remedies available to the federal plaintiff in such cases.
In Rizzo, as in Hicks, the Court made no effort to balance the
interests at stake; instead, it latched on to the single factor of federalism
to rationalize its invocation of equitable restraint principles. The replacement of Younger interest-balancing with this less structured mode
of analysis in the Court's two most recent applications of the equitable
restraint doctrine suggests a disturbing trend which is not easily reconciled with its earlier decisions. If Rizzo's alternative holding is interpreted as a definitive application of the doctrine to state executive
action, it will be virtually impossible to obtain federal injunctions against
state officials who direct or condone deprivations of constitutional
rights. 20 1 This result is wholly unwarranted, for it would deny to
199. One commentator has proposed that state courts should always be looked to in
the first instance for anticipatory relief against state judicial proceedings, and that federal
court intervention is justified "[olnly where state anticipatory relief is nonexistent,

saddled with procedural obstacles, or otherwise ineffective to protect federal constitutional rights ....

."

Whitten, supra note 17, at 681.

For a detailed exposition of the

theory, see id. at 687-91.
200. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
201. This interpretation appears at first reading to go beyond the Court's holding in
Rizzo, but it follows logically from the Court's earlier assessment of the relation
between section 1983 and the equitable restraint doctrine. Rizzo's disposition of the
scope of liability under section 1983 indicated that an official who condones the
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persons aggrieved by such action a significant part of the remedy which
section 1983 was enacted to assure them. Until the Supreme Court
unambiguously extends the doctrine of equitable restraint to state executive action, lower courts should be leery of giving Rizzo a generous

reading. The case is sufficiently peculiar so that it may be distinguished
on its facts without resort to sophistry or distortion. 202 On the other
hand, a broad interpretation of Rizzds pronouncements would further
erode the interest-balancing analysis on which the integrity of the equitable restraint doctrine depends, and would seriously undermine the

efficacy of section 1983 as a shield against the infringement of basic
liberties by state executive action.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of equitable restraint reflects an appreciation of the

"special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law." 0 3 In its
initial formulations of the doctrine, the Supreme Court achieved a

salutary accomodation of the competing policy considerations involved.
Its early decisions were guided by an analytical method which sought to
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates is not liable, whereas the official who directs
or actively participates in such conduct will be answerable under section 1983. But if the
equitable restraint doctrine is applied to all executive action, its dictates will ordinarily
require dismissal of the section 1983 suit even though a cause of action clearly exists
under the statute. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the fact that the
official defendant has directed the challenged activity does not ensure that a federal
injunction may be issued against him. It may be possible to circumvent the doctrine by
characterizing such direct involvement as bad faith or an extraordinary circumstance, but
the limited scope which has been accorded both of these exceptions to Younger offers
little encouragement that the effort would succeed. See notes 35 & 38 supra and
accompanying text. Fortunately, this expansive interpretation of the Rizzo holding has
not been applied in the first authoritative treatment of the case by a lower federal court.
See Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 508-09 (M.D.
Ala. 1976) (three-judge court) (distinguishing Rizzo on ground that official defendants
in this case directed and actively participated in unconstitutional conduct).
202. One salient point of distinction is the nature of the injunctive relief which is
sought. Affirmative injunctions such as the one granted by the Rizzo district court,
which not only ordered city officials to change their internal policies but suggested how
it should be done, may legitimately be construed as more offensive to federalism than
prohibitive injunctions which merely direct the cessation of specific unconstitutional
activity. Another distinguishing factor is the lack of direct involvement by supervisory
officials in the allegedly unconstitutional course of action. See Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 508-09 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (three-judge
court) (issuing injunction which directed mayor to halt various practices in administration of municipal court system on basis of evidence showing mayor to be "an executive
whose participation in or approval of major policy decisions [was] vital").
203. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
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identify and assess the relative weight of the various interests at stake.
This interest-balancing analysis has been conspicuously absent from the
Court's most recent treatments of the doctrine, and the justifications
offered in its place are far from persuasive. The consequence of this
less structured approach has been the application of equitable restraint
principles to factual settings where they have no place. State interests of
relatively small significance have been overprotected, and the policy
favoring access to federal court which is embodied in section 1983 has
been virtually ignored. Unless the rule of equitable restraint is to be
applied in disregard of the reasons for its existence, federal courts
should avoid improvised rationalization and return to the balance-ofinterests model which gave rise to the doctrine in the first instance.

